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ABSTRACT
Both a naive logistic model and a sophisticated age class model
are used to investigate competitive equilibria for a renewable natural re-
source, A rational expectations model is presented and tested for Douglas
Fir stumpage supply. Forest Service policy is discussed" It is concluded
that explicit valuation of standing timber stock.for other than lumber pur-
poses leads to a coherent forest policy consistent with the Multiple-Use
Sustained Yield Act of 1960.
Public ownership and government regulation are prevalent in
the renewable natural resource field, Fish, lobsters and other valuable
marine life are protected by a maze of catch limitations. Public owner-
ship of timber lands is not uncommon in many countries. In the U.S. about
one-third of all timber land is publicly owned, Government ownership and
regulation makes the government responsible for deciding how much of these
resources are used in the present and how much will be available in the
future. Resources have two sources of value: the end products they pro-
duce are consumer (fish cakes, wood frame houses, lobster dinners) and the
stock of the resource provides externalities by its very existence (forests
provide recreation, fish provide food for other fish, etc.). The price
consumers are willing to pay for a resource is an adequate measure of the
resource's private value. The public value is admittedly much harder to
measure. (What would the last Dodo bird or carrier pigeon have been worth?)
The United States Forest Service appears to make its harvest de-
cisions without placing any weight on prices. Below it is shown that a
policy very like the one the Forest Service actually follows can be arrived
at by maximizing the present discounted value of the timber stock for pub-
lic (recreation of wildlife) purposes. Further, the analysis of present
discounted value gives a proper criterion for judging forest improvement
projects while the present analytical framework (Maximum Sustainable Yield)
does not. The difficulty with present discounted value is that the future
prices are unknown. Much of this thesis is devoted to building a rational
expectations model to predict future prices. An outline of the sections of
this paper follow.
Section 1: Discusses the difference in growth functions between
fish and trees. Develops the formula for an optimal policy for a present dis-
counted value maximizing producer facing constant prices.
Section 2: Uses a simple logistic model to discuss a renewable
resource in a simple competitive world. The inclusion of a demand curve in
the model causes there to be a smooth flow of the resource. If the initial
stock of the resource is large compared to the eventual steady state stock,
then the stock is slowly reduced to the steady state stock and, at the same
time, prices are rising. The model is extended to include a nonrenewable re-
source; it is seen that the inclusion of the nonrenewable resource, in the
case cited, can cause the extinction of the renewable one.
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Section 3: Develops a rational expectations model for trees, It
is seen that finding the expected equilibrium is equivalent to maximizing a
consumer surplus expression.
Section 4: The model of section three is estimated.
Section 5: Forest Service policy is discussed in light of the
model above, It is found that a small value to standing stock will justify
the difference between competitive action and current government policy.
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Section 1
The Effect of Growth Specification on Optimal Policy with Constant Price
Natural resources are usually partitioned by their ability to
reproduce. Those resources that have no sex life are called non-renewable,
while those that reproduce themselves (or are somehow regenerated) are
called renewable. The economic analysis of non-renewable resources is
particularly simple. Under simple assumptions about extraction cost,
a necessary condition for the resource to be made available in every time
period is that MR - MC increases at the producer's rate of time dis-
count. Given that prices must rise exponentially, demand equations, and
the amount of the resource involved, it is not difficult to find the quan-
tity sold in every period.
The foremost example of a renewable resource is fish. Here a
growth law is postulated (x = f(x) -c) where x is the stock of fish and
c is the catch. (Noitce that a non-renewable resource is just one for
which f(x) = 0.) The simplest case is where x is one-dimensional and f is
concave. It is easy to show that faced with an exponentially growing price,
a present value maximizing fishery owner will adopt a bang-bang control --
he will reduce (increase) his stock to some optimal level and maintain it
there. It is an implication of a logistic type growth law that only part
of a homogenous population will be harvested.
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Section 1.1
Age Class:
A simple model of a natural resource, x = f(x) - c, says that
growth is a function of the biomass (or possibly number of individuals)
of the population. This model will best describe populations where the
age distributions of the individuals is irrelevant for population growth.
Bacteria, locusts or short-lived fish are examples of populations well-
described by a simple biomass equation. Additionally, any population har-
vested in such a way as to keep the age distribution constant will be
well described by a simple biomass equation. Since trees, and for that
matter long-lived fish, grow at different rates at different ages, it is
2
necessary to keep track of each age class. Colin Clark works out the
optimal harvest policy for fish and finds the present discountdd value
maximizing policy is likely to involve the use of a fishing net with a
mesh that catches large fish but not small fish. When there are high fixed
costs to fishery, Clark finds the optimal policy is to catch "all" the fish
in one year and not return until the fishery has rebuilt its stock. It
would seem that Clark's age class model could be carried over to trees.
This is not so.
The crucial difference between fish and trees (besides flavor)
is their sex lives, a stylized version of which follows. Fish are recruited
(which means survive until some critical age) in constant numbers per year
regardless of conditions. Mortality and slowed growth of individuals
account for the familiar logistic shape of the function "f" in the biomass
equation x = f(x) - c.
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That is, more fish mean less food (or oxygen or hiding places)
per capita. In turn, less food means less growth. The primary restraint
on growth is the crowding effect.
Trees have a different history: new trees sprout when old ones
are removed. When Douglas firs are young, they are packed tightly together.
As they age, the hardier and faster growing trees shade out the less hardy
trees. This is the same crowding effect fish exhibit. The difference be-
tween fish and trees is that the harvest of fish alleviates the crowding
while the harvest of trees may or may not alleviate their crowding., Trees
are subject to two kinds of harvest: thinning and cutting. Thinning --
and other methods of timber stand improvement -- is the removal of only
some of the trees on a given plot. The object of thinning is to give
the remaining trees more light and hasten their growth. Sometimes the re-
moved timber is commercially valuable and sometimes it is not. Cutting
a stand of trees does nothing for the remaining trees because there are
no remaining trees. Cutting a stand replaces old growth with seedlings.
Thus cutting and thinning have different effects. Thinning is akin to the
harvest of fish while we take cutting as our model of the harvest of trees.
Thinning is to be considered as a suboptimization problem that has already
been carried out and is embodied in the relevant growth functions. This
assumption makes attention to age class in trees of paramount importance.
Since trees of different age classes grow at different rates, a simple
biomass equation will not be able to distinguish between a young and old
stand of equal volume. Another unpleasant effect of the biomass formula-
tion is that it leads to a policy of cutting only some trees of an even-
aged stand on the false assumption the rest will grow faster. In short,
-9-
one must consider the age class problem for trees.
While it is an externality that complicates the optimal policy
of a fishery, it is the simple economic concept of rent that makes it diffi-
cult to find the optimal policy for forest management. The proceeds of
the sale of a natural resource are attributable as a rent to the ownership
of the land or sea that supports the resource. Since no one owns the sea,
fishermen do not worry about the "rent" a fish should be paying. This is
why fish are called a common property resource.
Much is said about the common property nature of fish. Spence's
study of blue whales, Reddy's model of lobsters,
and Vernon Smith's4 theoretical article are all recent examples of work
that shows lack of private ownership makes fishing inefficient.
Although the rent to growing trees is appropriated by the owners
of the land, rent is still an important consideration in the growing of
trees. Old trees occupy space that would otherwise be devoted to young
trees (or ranch houses, shopping centers, etc.). The best alternative use
of a land parcel determines the rent of the parcel. Should an old tree no
longer be able to pay the competitive rent for the land on which it stands,
then a profit maximizing business would cut the tree down. Rent is one of
the determinants of optimal rotation age. The effects of rent are most
clearly seen in the sections on forestry in a constant price world, and
in the linear forest model.
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Footnotes
1 Colin Clark, "Mathematical Problems in Biological Conservation,"
American Math. Monthly (forthcoming). Clark's article
contains an extensive bibliography.
2 Colin Clark, Gordon Edwards, and Michael Friedlaender, "Beverton-
Holt Model of a Commercial Fishery: Optimal Dynamics,"
Journal Fisheries Research Board of Canada 30, No. 11
1973.
3 Bernard J. Reddy, "The New England Lobster Pot Fishery: An Em-
pirical Study," Massachusetts Institute of Technology,
1975 (unpublished).
4 Vernon Smith, "General Equilibrum with a Replenishable Natural
Resource," Review of Economic Studies, 1974 Symposium,
p. 105.
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Section 1.2
Forestry In A World With Constant Price
Although the profit maximizing policy for managing a forest in
a regime of constant price expectations has been known since 1849 and is
a straightforward exercise in dynamic programming, many famous economists
have published incorrect solutions. The source of many of their errors
is the concept of ground rent. The model that follows shows the role of
ground rent in determining when to cut trees. The model also presents
the technology of a forest economy in its simplest form. Later we join
this technology with a market mechanism.
Before continuing any further it is necessary to explain the
problem and the conventions used (assumptions made). By a forest I mean
a plot of ground that will support the growth of trees, and any trees on
that ground. When trees are cut from this forest they become immediately
and costlessly available to consumers. All the costs of maintaining this
forest are assumed to come at cutting time. In reality this is not so --
taxes, thinning expenditures, fire protection, nursing young trees
are all significant expenses occurring throughout the forest's life.
The assumption is made purely for simplicity and is not defensible in
any other way.2 When a price is quoted it means price net of cutting and
reforesting costs. These costs are assumed constant per unit output.
Replanting is assumed to happen immediately on cutting. The act of cutting
a tree is also the act of planting a tree. The forester is assumed to
maximize present discounted value with rate of interest r. Under these
conditions we show that there is an optimal rotation for trees -- an age
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younger than which trees are allowed to grow and older than which they
are cut. Let X(a) be the stock of trees of an even age class stand.
"la" is the age of these trees a = T - T where the T's are the n h
n+1 n
and n+lst time the forest is cut. Let V(Tn n-Tn-1 )) be the value of
the timber at time T n. The present value (PV) of the stand is thus
-rT -rT 2  -rT 2
PV(O) =e _ V(T,X(T 1 - 0))+ e 2V(T 2 X(T 2 - T1 ))+ PV(T2 )e 2
The forester's problem is to choose a set (T1 ,... ,Tn) of times to cut the
forest. The first order conditions for a maximum are 3(PV)/@Ti = 0. Thus:
3V 3V dX -r(T 2 -T 1 ) DV dX
[- + - - e T = rV(T 1 )
at 3x dt 1 Dx dt 2
Value is equal to price times quantity: V = q'X . (A more general formu-
lation of value would include a cost function: V = q.X - C(X), where C(X)
is the cost of removal and replanting. If C(X) is proportional to X then
the simple formulation gives the right answer.)
Making the substitution:
[P(T 1)X(T) + P(T1 ()] - [e 2 P(T 2 )X(T 2 -T 1 )]
= rP(T 1)X(T1)
The above expression explains the experiment of lengthening the first period
a little while shortening the second period the same amount. The first term
is the gain from holding the stock a little longer. There are two parts
to the gain. First the price changes. Second the quantity changes. The
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second term is the discounted value of the timber that is lost from the
second period harvest. Thus the lefthand side is the change in timber
value from altering the plan. The righthand side is the loss attributa-
ble to the discount rate from postponing the cut. Their equality is
obvious. Before finding the optimal policy for the case of constant or
exponentially changing price, one more variational experiment should be
undertaken.
3PV(O)/aT2 =0 => [P(T 2 )X(T2 ) + P(T 2 )X(T2 )]exp(-rT2 ) +
3PV/DtIT2 exp(-rT2) r[P(T 2)X(T2) + PV(2)]exp(-rT2)
Comparing this formulation to the one previous, one sees that the loss from
lengthening a period by epsilon is the same as the loss from putting off
the entire plan by epsilon. Perhaps this makes the importance of ground
rent (which is the present value) a little clearer. When deciding when
to cut a forest one must remember that only on cutting is the land freed
for another rotation. This matter is neglected in many forestry and
economics texts.
Now we are ready to use the first formula to derive the optimal
rotation age in the event that p = bP (b constant). Since the problem
facing the forester is the same (up to a multiplication constant) at the
beginning of period n+l as it was at the beginning of period n, his action
must be the same. This implies a uniform tree life of L. That is
Tn - Tn- = L, all n. Using p = bp and dividing the first form of
the variational equation by p:
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bX(L) + X(L) -e-i(L)
or
X (L)
X(L)
(r - b)
S-e
= rX(L)
(r - b)e rb)L
~ (b-r)L(e -1
It is
tiply again by p
PX
--x =
easier to interpret the above equation for L if we mul-
and use a familiar series expansion
r - b 00 (b-r)Li
(b-r)L = (r - b) Z e1 - e 1=0
We have proved Theorem 1.1:
Theorem 1.1
If the assumptions of this section hold and price is
increasing at the exponential rate b and the interest
rate is r, then the present value maximizing rotation
age for trees is implicitly defined by:
X(L)
= (r - b)/(l - exp(b - r)L))
X(L)
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This says that the percentage change in value from holding a
stock a little longer equals the interest rate times a correction factor
that accounts not only for putting off the plan a little this cut
-rL-0 -rL-(e = 1) but also every future period i, (e 1). Clearly, large r
and L make the correction factor irrelevant. (For Douglas fir L 90,
r z 10%, 1 - e~9 can be taken to equal 1 for our purposes. For southern
pines L is approximately 18 and the issue has some relevance.) Samuelson fn
discusses the relation between L and the rotation ages proposed by other
authors. One of these ages, M, the maximum sustainable yield, is what
the U. S. Forest Service appears to have as its goal and, perhaps, policy.
M corresponds to an interest rate of zero and constant price (or a constant
present value price -- b = r). M is the rotation length that maximizes
the volume of timber removed and M > L. A later part of this paper will
be directed to Forest Service policy.
-16-
Footnotes
1 Paul A. Samuelson, "Forestry in an Evolving Society," Economic
Inquiry (forthcoming).
2 Mason Gaffney, "Taxes on Yield," British Columbia Institute for
Economic Policy Analysis, 1975 (unpublished).
3 Samuelson, op cit.
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Section 2
The Effect on Optimal Policy of a Market Mechanism in a World
with Simply Specified Growth
The market mechanism makes it undesirable to cut large sections
of a forest or harvest a large percentage of all fish in any given time
period. This section explicates the relation between harvest, stock,
price and the rate of price increase. Crudely, it is seen that a large
initial stock calls forth a policy of gradual reduction in population and
increase in price.
Section 2.1
A Simple Renewable Resource with a Market Partial Equilibrium
It is unfortunate that the detail of the technology of growing
trees obscures the price dynamics of a simple equilibrium model. To obtain
the clearest picture of the price mechanism over time, I adopt a simple
technology! x = f(x) - c, and a simple description of the rest of the
world.
The world has one producer who is a price taker. (One could
have many identical producers -- but it only adds constants to the cal-
culations.) At every instant in time he faces a (twice continuously differ-
entiable) downward sloping demand for his product. He knows this demand
and uses it to predict correctly the future path of prices. That is to
say, he has rational expectations and those expectations are fulfilled.
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As before, the producer is assumed to maximize the present discounted
value of resource landings with discount rate r. The resource pool,
of which he is the sole owner, has a reproduction law of the form
x = f(x) - c, where x is the stock and c is the harvest at time t,
the time subscript being suppressed. "f" is twice continuously differ-
entiable and is assumed to have the usual shape:
f(O) = 0 f" < 0 f(k) = 0 f(x) > 0 xE[0,k]
An example of such a function is the logistic, xg(l - x/k). For a further
explanation, see Colin Clark's American Math. Monthly article.
The producer's problem is:
max f0 e q c dt
s.t. x = f(x) - c
x > 0 ce[0,0]
where q(t) is the expected price at time t. Consumers are represented
by a downward sloping demand curve D(q) which is continuously differen-
tiable and for convenience, is assumed to be the same in every period.
If we had information on the relative prices of the resource and other goods
in the future,we would include it in the demand curve.
The market clearing equation states D = c or catch equals
demand at every instant.
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The first step in solving this problem is to apply the maximum principle
of Pontragin et al. to the producer's problem. Let
-rt
H = e q . c + X(f(x) - c)
be the Hamiltonian. Necessary conditions for an optimum are;
x 3H/X = f(x) - c
A = -3H/x ff'(x)A
transversality condition lim Xx 0
and the maximum principle; choose c to max H at every time t. A quick
examination of H shows that either c is one of zero and infinity or
A = e -rtq We now impose an additional restriction on the 'demand curve,
Zero is demanded only at infinite price and an infinite amount is demanded
at zero price. This is sufficient to rule out any possibility that
0 e-rt q. In the more usual constant price case the information that c
takes an interior value is manipulated to find the steady state solution,
We use this information to reduce our system to two equations. Substitute
qe-rt = A into A = f'A to get q = (r - f')q.
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Substitute c = D(q) to get
x = f(x) - D(q)
So far it has been shown that the first order conditions for
a maximum are
q = (r - f')q
x = f - D(q)
x0 = x(O)
lim q exp(-rt) x = 0
(A remark: Another way to formulate the expected equilibrium problem is
the following Hamiltonian:
H = exp(-rt) (q c + /r D(z)dz) + X(f(x) - c)
q
The q and the c are regarded as state variables: the first order condi-
tions will be as above. The equation has the interpretation as minimizing
on q the sum of producer and consumer surplus -- with consumer surplus
defined from Marshallian demand curves -- while maximizing surplus on c.
This is a two-point boundary value problem. It is complicated by the
nature of the end time or transversality condition. The way to find the
nature of the solution is by way of a phase diagram. Consider the vector
field V(q,x) = (q,x). First we show that V is singular at only one point
-21-
* *
which we call a steady state and denote (x , c ). Then we show that only
solutions that converge to the steady state meet the transversality con-
dition.
The system has an obvious steady state x*, c* defined by
f'(x*) = r and f(x*) = c*. The steady state is unique. The solution
to f' = r is unique under the assumption that f" < 0. Could there be
another steady state? Let xs be such a quantity, r - f' 0 0 by asser-
tion. Moreover, f' is constant. Thus q = a exp((r - f')t). The single
valued property of downward sloping demand finishes off the possibility
that xs is a steady state.
The table below shows the direction of a solution passing
through an arbitrary point of each of the quadrants in (x,q) space.
Quadrant (x,q) or V
IV
II(+-
III(-)
IV(-+
Suppose that (x,q)0 is in quadrant I. Then both x and q increase without
bound. The assumption that there is a maximum size to the population
assures that f' is zero for large enough x. Thus q increases at the
rate of interest in the long run and q exp(-rt)x increases without bound.
This is a violation of the transversality condition. Similarly an initial
point in quadrant three can be viewed as violating the transversality con-
dition by going to negative infinity. If one insists on the variables
-22-
:
I
'I
I
-immmo
j ,w 4CY)qw D(Oz 0
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Phase Diagram in x,c Space
C:o
Cm
ir kw? C -:0
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being positive, then it is ruled out by the assumption of infinite demand
at zero price and zero demand at infinite price. Either way one views
it, initial values of q that place (x,q)0 in quadrant III are impossible.
Before proceeding to even-numbered quadrants, we need to examine
the boundaries of the quadrants: that is the x = 0 and q = 0 curves.
Except for the singular point at (x*,q*), any solution that begins on one
of these curves will immediately cross into quadrants I or III and thus be
inadmissable.
In quadrants II and IV, x is either steadily decreasing or
steadily increasing. Therefore, any characterisitc passing through these
quadrants must intersect their boundaries and pass into quadrants I or
III, or the characteristic must terminate at (x*,q*).
Because we have made strong regularity assumptions on f and D,
there exists exactly one characteristic that passes through the point
2
(x*,c*).
We have shown that only paths that end at the steady state
meet the transversality condition. This allows us to identify one
characteristic along which all solutions must lie and thus relate the
starting (or any other time) price to the initial quantity.
We have demonstrated the following two theorems:
Theorem 2.1
The partial equilibrium model with autonomous demand has
a unique steady state and converges to the steady state from
any initial allocation. The steady state values are implicit-
ly defined by f'(x*) = r and f(x*) = c* and D(q*) = c*.
-25-
Footnotes
1 Colin Clark, American Math. Monthly, op cit.
2 Witold Hurewicz, Lectures on Ordinary Differential Equations. Cambridge:
MIT Press, 1958.
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Theorem 2.2
If xO is greater than x*, then q0 is less than q* and
q increases monotonically at the rate r - f'(x) while
x falls monotonically. In particular, q/q is greater
than r when x exceeds x is equal to r when x equals
x and is positive but less than r when x is greater
than x* but less than x.
Section 2.2
Linearization of the Simple Model
What is left to figure out is the initial price, q0 . To this
end we know the "end time" price q*: D(q*) = f(x*) = c*. But
90 = q*/(exp f r - f'(x(t))dt) and depends on the time path of x(t).
One can approximate q0 by linearizing the differential equations that
make up this system. Let Aq and Ax be the state variables expressed
as a deviation from the steady state values. That is Aq = q - q* and
Ax = x - x*. To a first order approximation the problem of a renewable
resource is:
Aq 0 -f"(x*)q* Aq
Ax -D'(q*) f'(x*) Ax
The characteristic polynomial is b2 - bf' - D'f"q* and the characteristic
roots are
-27-
b = (f' + /"f' + 4D'f"q*)/2
b =2 (, - /,f2 + 4D'f"q*)/2
which are real and of opposite sign, b2 being negative. The eigenvectors
are:
b. = i = 1,2
-b /flq* /
Thus solutions following the laws of motion of this system -- intertemporal
myopic efficiency -- are of the form
z(t) = a1h1 exp (b 1 t) + a2h2 exp (b 2 t)
But the transformed end time conditions are that lim z = 0. This implies
t->o
a1 = 0. Thus the initial price q0 can be found from the following:
2Ax(-f"q*)
Aq =
f' - /f' 2 + 4D'f"q*
If Ax(0) is the initial stock, then Aq(0) is found from the above and
q(0) = Aq(O) + q*.
The above formula shows that Aq has the opposite sign of Ax
Thus if the stock is greater than the steady state stock, price will start
below the equilibrium price and rise to it. One can draw a phase diagram
of this system:
-28-
Any path that does not start on b2 will end on b1 and call for
infinite quantity and price. One can separate the economic problem into
two parts: intertemporal myopic efficiency -- being on some trajectory
defined by the model -- and end time conditions -- ending at a steady
state rather than an infeasible solution.
If anything is surprising in this model it should be the state-
ments on price. Why should the price rise along an optimal path when
x > x*? If price didn't go up the producer would dump all his surplus
resource on the market now. The price system must create a capital gain
for the producer to induce him to hold his resource. This is particularly
important in the case of trees. There we will find price must rise on
virgin timber fast enough to offset both the interest rate and the oppor-
tunities for new growth.
-29-
Section 2.3
Changes in Demand
One can inquire how shifts in demand change the allocation of
a nonrenewable resource over time. The untranslated phase space provides
the easiest exposition of the basic result on shifts in demand. If D(q)
is a demand curve then D(q) = D(q + a) is an inward shift of the demand
curve D. Let all the variables of the shifted system be represented
with overbars.
We have:
Theorem 2.3
If "a" is a positive number, the shifted system will
converge to a steady state (x*,q*) and x* = x* while q* = q* - a.
Moreover, if z(t) = (x(t),q(t)) is the optimal path of the
initial system and z(t) = (x(t)(t)t))is the- optimal path of
the transformed system, then the trace of z will lie below the
trace of z, assuming that x0 is greater than zero.
The first part of the theorem is a consequence of Theorem 2.1
and elementary algebra. For the second part, consider the phase space
(x,q).
-30-
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The x = 0 locus is described by the equation x = f(x) - D(q).
Thus, changing D to D increases the RHS of the x equation by decreasing
demand. This requires an adjustment of x, a decrease if x is less than
x max and an increase otherwise. The result, as can be seen on the diagram,
is a lowering of the x = 0 curve. What remains to be shown is that z and
z don't corss. Suppose z and z did cross at the point (q,x). q = q since
the price equation is the same for both. x is greater than x, from the
equation for x. Thus the bar system will move above the original system
and can never be below it. But the bar system has its equilibrium below
the original system. This is a contradiction and the theorem stands.
The above theorem shows that for autonomous demand, a shift
in the demand curve does not change the longrun stock or flow of the
resource; the shift merely changes price.
Actually, a demand shift may have further effect, it may change
the slope of the converging arm z(t), and the speed at which the system
moves up the arm. The slope of the arm describes how much prices and
(through autonomous demand) how much consumption changes over time. Thus
a system with a flat arm describes a system with equality across time
(generations) while one with a highly sloped arm has a great difference
in the resource flows across generations.
The experiment I have in mind is a differential shift in the
demand curve. D = D(q + a) and vary "a" a small amount, w. We know that
dq*/dw = -1 and can find
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Theorem 2.4
db2 /dw = f"(D' + Dwlq*)/r2 + 4D'f"q*
The sign of db2/dw = -sgn(D' + D"q*)
or
db2 /dw > 0 if |D'j > D"q* or 1+ D"q*/D' > 0
< 0 if ID'| < D"q( or 1 + D"q*/D' < 0
where D"q*/D' is the elasticity of the first derivative
of demand with respect to price.
In the case that db2/dw is greater than zero, the overbar
system will converge more slowly to equilibrium since b2 will be less
negative than b2 and z = a2h2 exp (b2t). Moreover, h2 will be less steeply
sloped than h2 since
= (-b2/f"q*) and 1|21 < lb21
and f" is less than zero.
Thus the effects of slope and speed work together. Greater
slope and higher convergence speed go together (at least locally), and
provide for faster changes in quantity consumed over a given time interval.
here
Ab.d4w <0
I;a I > 61
4
a
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Section 2.4
Simple General Equilibrium Models
A genral equilibrium setting is more satisfactory than a partial
equilibrium one since the general equilibrium setting seems less artificial,
accounts for income effects, and permits rigorous welfare statements. It
is less satisfactory for estimation purposes, especially if the income
effects are small. The simplest of the general equilibrium models is the
one in which there is only the renewable resource. It turns out to be
identical to the partial equilibrium model. (The simple general equilibrium
model is just a Ramsey type problem and its solution is well known. The
special characteristics of a renewable resource -- a limit to the popula-
tion size -- never become important. Another case we consider, and this
case also amounts to a Ramsey type model, is the case of a renewable re-
source and a perishable resource. In both cases the important feature is
the autonomy of the derived demand function. The following general equi-
librium model is mostly useful for its extension to the case where the
resource provides an externality and for the comparison to the nonautonomous
case.
A Perishable Resource
Let m be labor or some other resource that cannot be stored from
period to period and is provided at a constant rate. If there is one con-
sumer with utility function U(c,m) exp (-rt) where c, as usual, is the
harvest of a renewable resource, and x = f(x) - c, then the consumer's
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problem of maximizing his happiness subject to the constraints of the
population he preys on results in the Hamiltonian:
H = exp(-rt) U(c,m) + X(f(x) - c)
and first order conditions,
MUc = exp(rt)X
A = -fA
Making the usual substitution of q = exp(rt)
utility condition we get
and inverting the marginal
q = (r - f')q
c = MUc 1(q)
This is exactly the system described in the previous section (if MU has the
reasonable property of being everywhere positive). For comparison with
a succeeding section we solve this for the case U = c m and a + Scl.
Clearly, N/l-a
1/1-a q
is the demand curve and f'(x*) = r, f(x*) = c* define the steady state stock
and quantity. Inverting the demand curve gives the steady state price, q*.
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The model has further meaning if one assumes that labor and
the resource are used to produce one good while leisure constitutes
another good. Suppose U(c,m) is of the form U(w,L) where w is a produced
good w = w(h,c), w neoclassical, and L + h = m where L is leisure
and h is hours worked. Will the man work more or less as time progresses?
If X0 is greater than x* we know that q rises and x and c fall
along an optimal path. For any given time we know the consumer solves
max U(w(h,c),m - h) by setting its derivative equal to zero:
h
U iw -U 2  0 
Since we know c decreases over time, we totally differentiate the first
order conditions to find dh/dc, multiply it by a negative number (the
change in c) and find whether or not the man works more.
First translate the F.0.C. to their equivalent form
NPL - MRS = 0 , where MPL is the marginal product of labor and MRS
is the marginal rate of substitution or MU h/MUc* We get the compara-
tive statics result:
dh* - (MP - MRS)
Dc L
dc* a
(MP - MRS)
Although the derivative of the marginal product of labor can
be signed by regularity conditions on the production function, the deriva-
tives of the MRS can take either sign and depend, ultimately, on the mag-
nitude and sign of the income effect. Moreover, even knowing the sign of the
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change in the MRS does not tell what its magnitude is. For instance,
take the case where both functions are Cobb-Douglas. The MRS = bc/h
b dependent on which Cobb-Douglas utility function is chosen (where b
is a constant). Let w = cah a+6<l.
w bc
F.O.C. MPL - MRS = -- -
H H
aF.O.C. 1 6aw
=- (- - b)
ac H c
DF.O.C. c 6(6 - 1)w
= - -( + b)
@H H2 c
Thus 3F.O.C. w
> 0 iff - > b/a6
ac c
3F.O.C. w
_F..C < 0 iff - > b/(l-6)
DH c
Assume that labor's share is greater than the resource share, a > 6
Thus, 6(1 - 6) > a6 and we distinguish three cases:
dH/dc > 0 when w/c > b/6(l - 6) > b/a6
dH/dc < 0 when b/(l - 6) > w/c > b/a0
dH/dc > 0 when b/(1 - 6) > b/a > w/c
-38-
In the normal first and third cases more work is done and less leisure
spent as the resource flow diminishes. Notice that only with less than
constant returns to scale can the amount of leisure spent go up as the re-
source flow is diminished.
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Section 2.5
General Equilibrium with the Stock Valued
The introductory chapter suggested one might value the stock
of a natural resource for its positive externalities. Forests have the
public good attribute of recreation. (The model that follows applies
equally well to management in a regime of taxes or the management of a
pest population. Simply make the externality negative.)
Again assume one consumer; this time let his utility function
be U(c,x) exp (-rt); as usual the natural resource is modelled
x = f(x) - c. Now the Hamiltonian is
H = U(c,x) exp (-rt) + X(f(x) - c)
and first order conditions after the usual transformation
A = exp (-rt) q
are
MUc = q or c = MUc 1 (q,x) where MU < 0 and MU > 0
c 2
q = (r - f')q- MUx
x = f(x) - MUc (q,x)
and lim Ax = 0
t-*O
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Note that the demand equation is still autonomous. x and q are related
by the transversality condition. Thus the results of the section on
autonomous demand curves hold here too. The q = 0 locus is found by
solving ( r - f')q - MUx(f(x),x) = 0. We assume the last term decreases
in x over the relevant range. Thus q = 0 lies to the right of the line
f'(x) = r. x = 0 = f(x) - MUc (q,x) is raised by the inclusion of x
in the demand so the phase diagram is:
and xs, the new steady state, is higher than the old steady state and may
even exceed x max. The steady state resource flow in f(x ) and may have
any relation to f(x*) the old steady state resource flow. The steady state
price, qs, will be higher if xs is greater than xmax , otherwise it is in-
determinate. We have shown
Theorem 2.5
Valuing the stock of a resource will cause the steady state
stock to be higher than it would otherwise have been. The
stock increase may raise or lower the steady state resource flow.
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Consider the example of Cobb-Douglas utility and f (x) = xy' for
a growth function, 1 > y > 0. f behaves badly -- it has no maximum --
but the analysis is easy.
a
u = c x
MU = a-l =q Nila f 6-1
MUc x Sc x
q = (r -yx )q - x+ya-1
* 1-. l/a
x = x - (qx /S)
ya+ -l
x = 0 implies q = x
q - 0 implies q = xya+-l/(r - Yx )
It is immediate that x* is infinite and q* is zero. The phase diagram is:
I \ Ik
(ItUr
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and the result is that conservation dictates an ever-increasing resource
stock.
This sort of example can be used to impute a value of stock to
an organization observed to be following a plan that does not lead to an
expected market equilibrium.
For example, consider the United States Forest Service. The
Multiple-Use Sustained Yield Act of 1960 instructs the Forest Service to
manage the nation's forests for lumber, recreation, and wildlife. The
forest service achieves these goals through a system of regulation that
provides for equal timber harvests in every year and timber harvests at
less than the rate one would expect from a competitive firm in early years.
The long run stock is x , and the resource harvest is f(x x). f(x ) is
max ma max
greater than f(x) for any other x. The preceeding description of the
Forest Service's policy is a little crude; a more complete discussion
of this matter will be found in the next chapter. For the purpose of
what follows it is sufficient to say that the Forest Service has ill-defined
goals that include using forest land for timber production and for other
uses. Although the Forest Service does not reduce its valuation of
standing timber to a single number, an economist trying to understand
what the Forest Service does could treat the Forest Service as if it were
trying to maximize an instantaneous utility function of the following
variety:
U(c,x) = q c + kx.
Below the possibility that the Forest Service takes maximim yield as its
goals is also discussed.
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Let consumers be represented by U(c) exp (-rt) while the resource holder
(the Forest Service) decides to attach a value, k = k0 exp (-rt) to
standing resource. Thus the demand equation is c = MUc~ (q), but the
producer has elected to maximize f/ exp (-rt)(q(t) c + kx)dt s.t.
x = f(x) - c. The Hamiltonian and F.O.C. for this problem are:
H = exp (-rt)(q c + kx) + X(f(x) - c)
exp (-rt) q => if c # 0
q = (r - f')q- k
x = f(x) - MUc~ (q)
Letting the population grow to xmax (f'(x = 0) is often called maximum
sustained yield. It is of particular interest that maximum sustained yield
implies a steady state with f'(x ) = 0 or x = xmax so that
k = rq = rMUc (f(x )).max
Although the concept of maximum sustainable yield (MSY) implies a steady
state valuation of the resource stock, it is without implication for the
dynamics. Does the conservation agency use the discounted steady state
price k0 exp (-rt) to make its intertemporal decisions? Do they have a
utility function that settles down to MUx(f(x),x) = k0 at the maximum
yield point? Neither question is amenable to theoretical solution.
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We summarize this discussion on MSY in
Theorem 2.6
Maximum sustainable yield implies the marginal utility
of holding the resource at the maximum yield point is
-l
a constant k equal to rq or MUc (f(x )). MSY has
max
no implication for the time path to reach the point xmax'
Section 2.6
A Renewable Resource in a General Equilibrium Setting with a
Nonrenewable Resource.
In this model there is both a renewable and a nonrenewable
resource. The stock of the nonrenewable resource is y(t) and its rate
of extraction is g. This leads to the following planner's problem, the
answer to which is also the perfect foresight competitive equilibrium
for a one-consumer (or Hicksian in the sense of Arrow and Hahn) world.
-rt
max f 0 U(c,g)e dt
s.t. y = -g
x = f(x) - c
x(O) = x0 and y(O) =Y
x,y,c,g > 0
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This is similar to Dasgupta and Heal.1 They have "capital"
instead of a renewable resource; they require the nonrenewable resource to
reproduce capital; and they have only one consumption good, c. Their
model is:
- -rt
max 0 U(c)e dt
s.t. x = h(x,g) - c
y = -g
x(O) = x0 and y(O) =y
x,y,c, g > 0
How the economy fares in the long run is shown to be a function
of the elasticity of substitution in the function h. Dasgupta and Heal's
model differs from mine in two major ways: 1. In my model there is a
limit to how much of the renewable resource (or capital good) may be stored.
2. In my model the nonrenewable resource cannot be converted into another
capital good for storage and later use. These differences assure, in the
long run of my model, that the flow of goods will be diminished. It is
the utility function that determines how much lesser amounts of the non-
renewable resource will hurt. (The utility function could be regarded as
being of a single argument, z, U(z) and z being a production function of
c and g, the resources: z = z(c,g) and z not storable. Perhaps this
makes the relation to Dasgupta and Heal clearer.)
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My model is solved by forming the Hamiltonian and finding the
first order conditions.
H = e-rtU(c,g) + (f(x) - c) + y(-g)
Conditions are placed on U to assure that g and c do not vanish. (Marginal
Utility (MU) at zero is unbounded.) The first order conditions are:
e-rtM c =
e-rtmug =
I = -f'
-y = 0
Introduce the current price variables s and v and get:
MUc = v = Xert
MUg = s = yert
Plainly s = s0 exp (rt) (since g is greater than zero everywhere). The
two conditions involving marginal utility can be solved for one resource
as a function of the other and own price.
c = MUc1 (v,g) where MUc~ < 0
g = Mug~ (s,c) MUg~ < 0
MUc- > 0
Mug~ > 0
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Solving the above one gets
c = MUc~1 (vMIU g(s 0 'ert ,c))
as the nonautonomous implicit derived demand for c as a function of own
price, v, and s0 the price of the nonrenewable resource. The rest of
the system is
v = (r - f')v
x = f(x) - c
Unlike the previous systems, the steady state is no longer clear. In
the event the MU increases at an exponential rate it may be possible
g
to find a "steady state" in which v decreases exponentially. For example,
if the utility function is Cobb-Douglas then a "steady state" can be
found in which g goes to zero but c and x are constant.
u = ca and a + < 1
g = MUg (s,c) = (s0e /c a)
C = MUc~ (v,c) = (v/goa)l/a - 1
which can be solved for c to reveal that
v = v0e(/ - 1)rt
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is consistent with an unchanging value of c , call it c'.
c = (v0 /a (s 0
c' is also determined from the equations x = f(x) - c' = 0 and
v = ( r - f'(x))v. Since r - f' = (/S -1)r, fixes x' and thus c' and
the product s0v0. But s0 is chosen so that MUg 1(s0 exp (rt),c')dt = y0.
This equation provides a solution for the steady state. (It is easy to
show that the system always converges to the unique steady state.)
Because f" is less than zero, the steady state with a non-
renewable resource as well as a renewable one has a higher renewable
resource rate of interest and a lower steady state stock than a similar
economy with just a renewable resource. For instance, consider the economy
with a constant flow of some resource M -- say labor -- and the usual
renewable resource. Such an economy will generate the usual steady state
(f'(x) = r)). The economy with the exhaustible resource will (if it has
a steady state) generate a steady state with a lower renewable resource
stock and a smaller flow of renewable resource. This occurs because the
(second) cross partials of the utility function are positive. That is,
higher consumption generates higher marginal utility.
All of these models have the possibility of exhaustion and
extinction. For instance, suppose
or f'(x) = r(1/l - )f'(x = r
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has no solution. Then it would appear that the corner solution x = 0
is the long run equilibrium. Thus if is large (the nonrenewable re-
source is much more important than the renewable one), it will be right
to drive the renewable resource to extinction. Because the marginal
utility of zero is unbounded, extinction will only happen asymptotically.
This discussion leads to
Theorem 2.7
In the context of the model of this section, if U1 2
is positive, then a steady state, if one exists, will
involve a resource stock lower than that implicitly
defined by f'(x) = r.
Theorem 2.8
If the utility indicator is Cobb-Douglas, then the
steady state with a nonrenewable resource will be
defined by f'(x) = 1/(1 - )r; price of the renewable
resource, v, will be decreasing exponentially at the
rate r - f'(x ); and the stock of the nonrenewable
resource will be run to zero. By comparison, if
the second resource were perishable instead of non-
renewable, then the steady state would be defined by
f"(x) = r, price constant.
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This completes our discussion of the two- perculiarities our
model is designed to wed: demand equations for a renewable resource and
the reproductive manners of trees. In the next section we present our
full supply model.
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Footnotes
1 P. Dasgupta and G. M. Heal, "The Optimal Depletion of Exhaustible
Resources," Review of Economic Studies, Symposium 1975,
p. 3.
-52-
Section 3 A Model for Estimation
Section 3.1
Continuous Time
What would an equilibrium model look like in continuous time?
Let X(t,a) be the number of acres of timber at time t of age a. This is
just like our optimal rotation age model except we now allow there to be
forests of different ages at the same time. We insist that at any two
times the amount of land in the forest is the same. If A is the set of pos-
sible ages, z(Wt,z)dz = a constant for all t. The growth equation for
this system is just an aging equation. Define C(t,a) as the removal from
class a in year t.
z
X(t,a) = X(t-z,a-z) - f C(t-g,a-g)dg
0
for any z > 0. This equation says that what there is today is what there
was last week or year less what was cut in the interim. The t-z,a-z occurs
because z days ago the current class a was z days younger. What remains
to be accounted for is what is cut.
X(t,0) = f C(ta)da
acA
To define the objective function we need to know one more thing: how much
wood (or value) is there to an acre of age class a? The function M(a)
answers that question. It is the growth function. The producers' prob-
lem is to max PV subject to the above equations.
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-r tPV = f Qe [ f C(t, )M(a)da]dt
0 aeA
Additionally, we require for each t that Q and (the term above in brackers)
supply be compatible with some demand equation. It is no wonder that the
mind boggles at solving this.
Before continuing to the discrete time model -- on which there is
some information -- it is time to justify the use of a finite time horizon
to approximate the infinite horizon. For any bounded set of prices, P
and positive discount rate, r, and number E > 0 there is a time T so far
away that the loss from neglecting times greater than T is less than E.
Since there is a limited amount of land and prices are bounded, only a
limited amount of value can be lost in any time period. Call that amount V.
00
Clearly E e-rt V can be made as small as desired by appropriate choice of T.
t=T
The simplest model of a forest economy is one with perfectly anti-
cipated prices, a linear technology, and a linear objective function.
The most common objective function for a resource holder is
present discounted value. Given prices, present value is linear in quan-
tity harvested. Although this linearity is a great computational advan-
tage, it has some unpleasant implications for the evaluation of risk.
Agents with linear objective functions are not risk averse. (They are
risk neutral.) In a world of perfectly anticipated prices (no risk) this
is not a serious drawback. The second problem with present value is that
an agent using the present value criterion feels no need to spread his
income over time. He may well execute a plan calling for no income for
the plan's first one hundred years. The assumption of ability to borrow or
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lend at a fixed rate of interest makes consumption plans other than 100
years of starvation feasible. Present value is not an ideal objective
function, but computational ease justifies its use.
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Section 3.2
Linear Forest Model
The technology for a forest is easily described. Land with trees
gets one year older every year until it reaches maturity and then it stays
the same age. (A better description of the technology would include mor-
tality. Some fraction of land bearing mature trees is returned to the
zero age class because of the death of the trees.) To each age there cor-
responds a volume of marketable product: timber. (This formulation is
close to that of Jungenfelt.) Trees of zero age are bare land with tree
seeds already planted. Harvesting is the act of converting old land (with
old trees) to young land (with tree seeds). The land's age at harvest
determines the volume of timber. Harvest can be thought of as producing
a joint product: timber and seeded land. (There is forestry literature
on the optimal amount of effort to replant and nurse trees but it always
assumes constant prices.) Formally, let X ti be the quantity of land at
time t occupied by trees of age i. In the absence of cutting,
(0 < i < n)X t+1 .+ = X (Unless i = n -- where n is the hypothesized
maximum age for trees -- in which case X t+,n Xt,n-1 + X tn.) Let Ctqi
be the quantity of land in age class i cut in year t. Then
X .+1~ + C .= X . if 0 < i < n. The interpretation is X and C are an
instantaneous division of land into two classes, one to cut and one to
mature further. This allocation is made at the beginning of each time
period. The recursion equation for X (bare land at time t) depends on the
cut in all age classes. All of the above can be put into matrix notation:
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Let
A = 0 ........ 0
.I
0 ........ 0
B = 0,1, 1... 0
. -I
0..........
then X - BC = AX )t t t-l
Xt = Xt,0 , Xt,n-1
C = (Ct,,'''''t n-1)
The minus sign before B is because of the definition of B. Its diagonal
elements are non-positive.
The above formulation completely describes the dynamics of this
model. It remains to describe the objective function. At the beginning
of any period t, (Ct,,...,'Ct,n) acres of land (bearing timber) are har-
vested. Assume M. units (board feet) of timber are on each unit (acre)
1
of land in age class i. Thus C .M. board feet of timber are removed
t,1 1i
n
from land of class i in age t. Total removals are Z C .M. or <C ,M>.
i0 tl I t
(inner product) at time t. If the prices to the resource holder net
of cutting and planting costs are Q(t) the objective function is
T
-rt
PV = E e Q(t)<Ct,M>
t=l t
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set P(t) = e-rt Q(t)
The problem facing a resource holder is to maximize present value subject
to initial conditions and a dynamic constraint. Thus
T
max Z P(t) <C ,M>
t=l
S. t. I0O
-A I
0 -A
0 0
0 . . . 0 1
0 . . . 0 i
I...o 1
. 1
0 ...- A 1
0
0
.-B
0
0
-0
0
This is a linear programming problem. Notice that the boundary conditions
X(0) = X0 are incorporated in the first line of the matrix. There are
only T time periods. No choices are made in period zero. Period zero
just determines the stock available for division in period one. If the
above matrix is abbreviated (A/B), the dual problem can be written
min <(0),X(0)>
s.t. X(A/B) > (0,...,0,M P(1),.. .,M P(T))
This instructs one to find the minimum value for land with trees in period
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or
E(PT (t) + M(i )P') PM( )
or rearranging and taking lim E + 0
P M'(i ) + M(i ) + P ' < P M'(0)T T - T
which is easy to interpret. The terms on the left are the change in
the value of the standing timber. The right hand term is the value of
the lost new growth. In a two-period model, with the periods very
close together, it is both necessary and sufficient for cutting. Now
* *
one can inquire about i's other than i , say i + z. A necessary con-
dition is:
PT M" + M'P' 0
or
M" P'
- + - < 0 V i > i*
M' P
Notice that M" < 0, M' > 0, p < 0 and p' > 0. Thus perversity de-
pends on the curvature of the growth function compared to the percen-
tage growth in price. When price doesn't rise there is no perversity.
The cut-no-cut sequence just requires a reversal of all the inequality
signs.
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zero subject to the constraint that the minimum value be greater than or equal
to the value of the anticipated harvests from time zero to time T. The value
of land with trees (or without) in period zero is nothing other than the com-
petitive selling price of the land. The dual problem is to find this compe-
titive price of land: it is instructive to expand the dual constraint:
X I -XA A > 0
t t+1 --
- B > P M
t - t
or A . > Pt M + XtO
t,j t+l,min(j+l,n) -
The equations say the shadow price of land in period t may not be less than
either the value of the timber plus the shadow price of bare land or the
shadow price of land of one year older age class in the next periid. To put
this another way, in each period the entrepreneur chooses either to cut or
to save trees of given age class. He chooses the option that maximizes his
profits. This recursive formulation makes it very easy to solve the dual
problem.
Remember that we are searching for a min of <X0 X 0 > where X > 0. In the
terminal period T, Atj > TM;+T, andT,0 = 0 (M= 0 -- seeded land at the
end of time is worthless). Why shouldn't A1dTj exceed PTM j? Because AT-l,j-1
> AT . and one is trying to minimize A . To find AT-l j one first needs to
find XT-10' X T-1,0 - XTl. We conclude AT-1,0 = ATi = PTM . Now we can
see that
A > P M+ A = P M.+PM
T-1,k - -T-1 j T-1,0 T-1 j T 1
T-lj > T,j+l = TMj+1 T-1 TMAX <PM ;PM. + PTM >T-+l T-1j T 1
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Obviously this can be solved for any finite number of periods. For instance,
one might find
= +P M.
T-1,O T-1, j-1 = P M + P Mt-1lj-1 Tl1
In general A5. will be the sum of a sequence of P M.'s determined by
the rule
M = ax <X P M. + X
t-lj t,j+l t-l j t-1,0
Whenever
t-1, j = P M.+ Xt-l j , t-1, 0
we shall say
*jEJ (t) = <jA . = P M. + X >t j t,O
*
It will not be hard to show that Ctj 0 iff jEJ (t), that timber is
cut iff the shadow price of timber is the market value of the timber plus
the shadow price of bare land.
Another way to state this problem is to find a saddle point of
L(X,CA) = <C ,M >P(t) - (t - BCt - AX
t=l t=1
T-3, j-3 T-2,j-2
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The F. 0. C.are:
1. DL/3/2 = m P(t) + X B < 0t t -
2. D3L/Xt = t t+1 A < 0
3. L/t t - B Ct - A X t-l 0
The Kuhn-Tucker theorem further asserts that Ctj L =0 so
t,J
M.(P(t) + (O. B). < 0 means C . = 0. Similarly
J t J t,J
RL/3.Xt .= 0
t ,J
so - + (X A). < 0 implies X . = 0 since X - BC must equal
t,J t+l J tJ t
a constant. Setting equation 1 equal to zero implies the other should be
set equal to the appropriate component of AXt-l. (It may happen that both
DL/kCt and 3L/3Xt = 0 -- this is an "edge" equilibrium -- any feasible
mixture of Ct and Xt produces the same value of the objective function.)
Thus we see that (for the case of present value) the dual problem can be
solved recursively with great ease. The solution to the primal then fol-
lows from the complementary slackness conditions. The value of the solution
to the dual problem is <X(0),X 0> where XOj is the value of bare land.
Here "value" means present discounted value and it is also the price of
land.
In short:
Theorem 3.1
Timber of class i is cut at time t if Xt,0 + PtM > Xt+1,i+1'
Timber may be cut or saved if X t, + P tM = Xt+1,i+. Otherwise
timber is saved.
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Footnote
1 Carl Jungenfelt, personal discussion based on a study of his
on Swedish forests. See: Mil och medel i skogspolitiken
(Ends and Means in Forestry Policy), Sweden, 1973.
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Section 3.3
The Linear Forest: Perversity
The usual description of forestry includes the policy "cut the
oldest trees first." It is easy to show that this is not always an
optimal policy. For example, consider a two-period forest with
prices PT-1 = 1 and PT = 2 and a growth function described by
M = (0, 8, 13, 14, 14.6, 15.19, 15.67). Note that Mi+ - M.
decreases with i and M i+/Ni decreases uniformly towards one. These
regularity conditions assure the growth function is concave. Now
t PT j and t Max{X +P T1 + P = Max{ PTNj+1'q T" t-l,j Tjj+l' T-1 j __ TTj+I
PM ;+PTMY}
For our example:
j Tj+l PTlM.+PT M delta T-1,j
0 16 16+0 = 16 0 16
1 26 16+8 = 24 2 26
2 28 16+13 = 29 -1 29
3 29.2 16+14 = 30 - .8 30
4 30.38 16+14.6 = 30.6 - .22 30.6
5 31.34 16+15.19 = 31.19 + .15 31.34
In period T-1, age classes 2, 3 and 4 should be cut while classes 1
*
and 5 should be allowed to grow. Thus the set J (t) introduced earlier
is not connected. It is not enough to specify a division point in the
age distribution of the forest; all of the calculations must be done.
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By our example we have proved
Theorem 3.2
In an optimal policy, old timber may be cut after
younger timber.
The result cited above -- cut younger trees first --
flies in the face of intuition. Were there no rent, the condition
for indifference between cutting and not would be the percent change
in present value of growing stock equals the rate of interest.
PV X P
- = - + - = r
PV X P
In this sort of world faster growing things always stand longer than
slower growing ones. But in the world described in the preceeding
models does have rent. Present value (of growing stock) is price
times quantity plus the land value.
PV = P * M + rent
PV = M + PL
PV P M
PV P + rent/M M + rent/P
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where, as usual, M is the growth function and P is price. The second
term of the RHS behaves properly, it decreases in the age of trees (M),
but the first term of the RHS behaves paradoxically: It increases in
age. Why does the capital gain term from holding growing stock in-
crease with age (or volume)? It is because it is a percent change in
value which the timber but not the rent undergoes and rent is a
larger proportion of the value of young stands than it is of old age
stands. Since the price of bare land is constant while the timber
volume may be great or small, the percent of the present value made
up by the timber volume varies as the timber volume. The owner of the
plot of land owns both the land and the timber. While the timber grows
the land does not. But to keep from switching to the best alternative
use, the owner needs the return on his whole investment to rise at
the rate of interest. Should timber be only a small fraction of
the value of his investment, then the gain (in percentage terms)
from a price increase will be less than the gain would be if timber
were a large fraction of the investment, because only timber and not
land are subject to the increase.
Let us further explore the phenomenon of cutting younger
trees first. Let c be the length of the time periods. There is some
i at which one is indifferent between cutting and not.
* *
PM o M(i + PTa4() i PTM(i + e)
Moreover, assume for small z, i + z age trees are worth cutting.
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* *
PT-M( ) > PTI'(i + E)
One would like to know if a no-cut regime will occur for any age older
*
than i. That is, does
* *
PTM(i + s) + PTM(E) < PTM(i + 6 + s)
This depends on
S S
P f0 M'(i + z)dz < PT f0 M'(i + c + z)dz
for some s. Since M is concave (d2Md I 2 <0) one knows that the inte-
gral on the right is smaller than the one on the left for any value
of s. But this is not enough to rule out perversity. One does not
know how much larger the left hand integral is; the difference in
P and P could outweigh the good effects of the concavity.
T- _ T
However, this does clarify one case: if PT - > PT and a no-cut-cut
transfer occurs, no-cut will not recur.
This can also be stated for small -- in differential form.
*
Again PTM(i + c) < PTM(e) + PT - eM(i ) which is the condition for
*
cutting at i. Equivalently:
PM(i )+ P EM' (i) < PTM() + M(i )P E - M(i
+" T £T± T dT
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So far, the discussion has been couched only in terms of
a two-period model. In a multiperiod model, the failure of price
to rise is again sufficient to assure no perversity. Suppose class i
is to be cut at time t in an optimal program.
PM(i) + X >
T t,O - t+1,i+l
and
= Max{P M(i + n)+A Inez, t+n < T, n > 0}
t+1,i+1 t+n t+n,0
Thus we have T-t inequalities of the form
PTM(i) + xt,0 t+nM i + n) + Xt+n,O
and the same analysis we used above guarantees us that all ages older
than i will be cut.
Theorem 3.3
Older timber will not be cut after younger timber if
M"/M' + P'/P < 0
and this implies that P/P negative is sufficient to
rule out the perversity.
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Section 3.4
Partial Equilibrium and the Linear Forest
A partial equilibrium world is interesting because it corresponds
to an approximation of a rational expectations world. Solving for the
partial equilibrium gives a set of prices and actions that are mutually
compatible. That is,if the producers believed the prices from the partial
equilibrium model and acted as if these prices would obtain in the future,
then the producers would take actions that would make those prices come
true. The partial equilbrium is an approximation because it ignores income
effects. No account is taken of the money producers get from selling lumber.
In particular, it is assumed that an addition to stumpage prices which
changes the income of firms and therefore of consumers, does not change
the consumer's demand for stumpage. Two justifications are offered.
First, the numerical size of the income effect is so small it can be
ignored. Second, a change in instantaneous price does not effect permanent
income and thus does not cause an income effect. 2
Consider a partial equilbrium world where the linear model defines
the supply set and correspondence for lumber and a set of functions,
Dt (P t), t = 1,...,T, defines demand. The model becomes producer:
T
max E I
t=l t
s.t. X3 -BC3 =AX2
X 2 - BC 2 =AX1
X1 - BC1 = AX0 , etc.
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I = P <M,C>
t t
Consumer: D (P )
t t
where demand is a function of own period price only
Prices: P = (P1,...,PT
Balance: Dt (P t) =<M,C>
To make the competitive assumption more plausible, one could imagine n
identical producers and j identical consumers and divide all quantities
by j or n. Of course, this wouldn't change anything.
We prove:
Theorem 3.4
There is a unique multimarket partial equilibrium.
The existence of a partial equilibrum is easy to demonstrate.
T T
Let S(P,.. . ,P) be the supply correspondence from R to R
Because the technology is neoclassical (closed, convex, contains 0, no
*
free producetion), S is upper semi-continuous. Let p be the inverse of
* *
the demand function. If p is continuous, then Sxp is upper-semi-continuous
from the space of prices crossed with the space of quantities to itself
(RT x R T). If one could find a (nonempty) compact, convex restriction
of RT x R T, call it A, with the property that S x p (A) A one could
apply the Kakutani fixed point theorem. Since we take the quantity of
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land is fixed, the set of possible productions, R, is easily seen to be
*
compact and convex. If p is continuous, then the set of possible prices
p (R) is also compact and its closed convex hull p (R) has all the desired
properties. Thus A = R v p (R) is the sought after restriction and there
is a fixed point in A. The fixed point is the multi-market partial equi-
librium.
* *
Does this provide a unique solution? Suppose p , c is a partial
*
equilibrium. Could p', c' be another partial equilibrium? Let p = p - p
and c = c - c'. ApAc > 0 because the technology is neoclassical. But
the assumption that demand curves slope down means ApAc < 0. Obviously,
the two condiitons cannot both be met. There can be only one partial
equilibrium.3
We now know there is a unique multimarket partial equilibrium.
Unfortunately that does not tell us how to find it. In theory, Scarf's
algorithm will find any fixed point. A more practical method takes advan-
tage of the problem's structure. It is possible to break the problem down
into a sequence of subproblems, one for each period. The assumptions on
demand (negative -quasi -semi -definite jacobian) make it possible to
view the problem as one of maximizing a concave function. There are well-
known algorithms whose convergence are guaranteed, that will do this. But
first we turn to Scarf's algorithm.
In theory, one could use Scarf's algorithm. In practice there
are a few drawbacks. Scarf suggests it is computationally unfeasible for
a model with many markets. Here the contemplated dimension is many
hundred years -- thus many hundred markets. The second objection to Scarf's
algorithm is that it provides only a good approximation to the true location
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of the equilibrium price-quantity. That is, it guarantees to terminate
with quantities so chosen to that supply-demand is small, but not neces-
sarily quantities near (in the Euclidean metric sense) the true equilibrium.
To break the problem down to a period by period problem, first look at the
producer's first order conditions for the last period:
PTM+ X TB < 0
-x < 0
small as possible
P = P(<C ,M >)T t
X - BC = AX
imply A is a function of AXT-1
and < implies CT ,J = 0
PT-1 + T-1 ,B) < 0
T < A
T - T-1
XTl 
- BCt 1 = AXT-2
PT-1 = P(<Ct,M>)
T-1j + (TA)j < 0 implies XTdj
yields AT(AXT- 2
but AT as
and
=0
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The implication here is that T-1 (AXTZ) can be found by refer-
ence toX T(AX T-1) and reference to the appropriate functions in period T-1.
Moreover, the solution must exist and it is unique. Thus, the partial
equilibrium solution for every period, as a function of its endowment,
can be found by reference to the next period's shadow prices and the
own period production and demand functions. This would be a very nice
property if there was any hope of an analytic solution for the shadow prices.
Even though an analytic solution is beyond reach, the recursive nature of
the model allows the easy use of numerical methods. XT (AXT-1) can be tabu-
lated for a couple of hundred values and extrapolated for all values
inbetween. At each step in the procedure, only the approximations used
in the previous step need be kept, if all that is wanted is the initial
shadow values and plan. This greatly reduces storage requirements.
This leaves us to solve the repeated problem: given AXTl,
X (AXT), PT = P( CT,M ), find CT
s.t. PT = P(<CT,M>) -- supply equals demand
XT + BCT = AXT-1 - production function
A = max<PTM + A (AX T);X T i+(AX T)A>
M.P + (X B). < 0 => (C .= 0i T T i T,i
-T .i (AT A). < 0 => X . = 0
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Suppose we were to choose a trial solution C'. By the first three condi-
tions above we would have A, X', and P'. On examination of conditionsT' T' T
four and five, we would likely find there is an i for which MiPT +
(X B). < 0 and C ; # 0 and some for which -X . + (A A). < 0
T ' T,i T,j T+1 j
and X .' 0. Consider what happens if in the latter case C . is increased
T,j T,j
some. One gets a new P lower than P T' XT > X TO', X Tj < X Tj
Since there is less timber in period T+l, V XT+1,i XT+1,, what happens
to X T Well P TM does fall, but AT,0 rises. Thus, we would not appear
to know what happens to PTM + XT0, though we would expect it to decrease.
In short, although we don't know for sure, we expect the shadow prices
for good j to move in the right direction to redress -X . + (X A). < 0.
T,j T+1 j
Unfortunately, the shadow prices for all the other age classes behave this
way, and many of those classes already satisfied the complementary slackness
conditions. Thus, a naive movement in what appears to be the right direction
might do much more harm than good.
The way to find the equilibrium is
Theorem 3.5
A plan that minimizes the sum of consumer surplus (with
Marshallian not Hicksian demands) and producer surplus is
also the market equilibrium.
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Footnotes
1 John F. Muth, "Rational Expectations and the Theory of Price
Movements," Econometrica 29, No. 3, July 1961.
2 Truman Bewley and Hal Varian, Consumer Surplus and the Permanent
Income Hypothesis, Harvard and M.I.T., 1975 (unpublished);
and Robert D. Willig, "Consumer Surplus Without Apology,"
AER (forthcoming).
3 Gerard Debreu, The Theory of Value. New York: Wiley, 1959.
4 Herbert Scarf with collaboration of Terje Hansen, The Computa-
tation of Economic Equilibrium. New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1973.
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Section 3.5
Consumer Surplus -- A Solution
This section exhibits a constructive algorithm to find the
multi-market partial equilibrium. Let ff(p) be the restricted profit
function at prices p and land allotment X0 ' or(p) = X t P  where
t
Yt =Ct,M} and is the amount of timber cut in period t. {Y(p)} is the
supply correspondence Y(p)c{Y(O)} is some point in the supply correspondence
7T(p) = p.Y(p).
Theorem 3.6
N
With these preliminaries, define V(p) = Z (f D t(z)dz) + F,(p)
t=l Pt
V will be shown to have a unique minimum
and at that minimum D(p) - {Y(p)} = 0. Minimizing V(p)
is equivalent to finding the equilibrium.
Claim: If D(p) + {Y(p)} 0, then there is a direction of
decrease for V at p.
*
Let Y (p)c{Y(p)} minimize the euclidean distance between D(p)
and the set {Y(p)}. The direction of decrease will be
*
-D(p) + Y (p)
I ID(P)- Y (p)
First it must be shown that {Y (p)}{Y(P+t)l|t = Y2 ' 1,1/8, etc.}
*
where the denotes closure. Y must be a limit point because, if not,
*
setting £ = excess supply at point Y would produce a new supply point that
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*
could be anywhere in the supply set. The assertion on Y is true because
*
of the law of supply: ApAY > 0. Let Ap = t2 and choose Y as the starting
*
point. Y = Y - Y . The definition of C assures us that 6 is orthogonal
new.
*
to a supporting hyperplane for the supply set at Y . All candidates for
Y must either be on that hyperplane or not in the supply set. Thus
new
*
Y is certainly a member of <lim y(p +ts)> . Now we are ready to examine
V. D V = D E/D(z) + lim.
t+0
Tr(p + 6t) - l(p)
t
and is the directional derivative. D t/D(z) =<e*D(p)>.
7r(p + et) - 11(p) p{y(p + te)}- p'{y(p)}
lim = lim
t+0-+ t t+0-+ t
+ lim E-y(p + tE)
t+0+
*
The first term vanishes. The second term + E y because of the lemma above.
*
Thus D V = e.(-D(p) + Y (p)) < 0 and p not an equilibrium prices implies
there is a direction of decrease for V.
Since one can choose prices so high that all goods are in excess
supply and so low that all goods are in excess demand, one can limit p to
a compact subspace, and assure that V does not take its maximum value on
the boundary of that subspace. This assures that V has a finite max
(because it is continuous). The sequence of V's created by always moving
in the direction e is both monotonically decreasing and bounded. It con-
verges to the max of V and the equilibrium of the multi-market system.
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Remark: At the bottom of this exposition is the negative quasi-definiteness
of the demand function's jacobian and the Poincar -Hopf lemma.
Although it is now possible to find the equilibrium, it is only
possible to tell a little about it. If one starts with a virgin forest,
discounted producer price P must rise fast enough to induce the resource
holders not to cut. After inventories have been liquidated, price goes
into a'limit cycle" (because it is bounded). One would like to know more
about the long run behavior, but all that can be said is that the limit
cycles are gentle. Choose At 2 , then A max(P+ 1M + 2
let class i be some class cut in t + 1
A = P M+ A
t+1,i Pt+1 Mi +t+1 1
Let j be cut in t. What would happen if we let it grow?
= PM. + > P M. +A
t + t+ll t+l j+1 t+2,1
NowA and > P M +A . Thust+1,1 - t+2,2 - t+l 1 t+2,1
PtM + P t+l Mj+l t+1,l t+2,1
since A can only underestimate the truth:t+293
A - A >p P - PM.
t+2,2 t+1,1 - t+l j+1 t j
and by use of the lemma on the following page
m(1)
A (1 - ) > P M - P M.
t+2,2 m(2) t+1 j+1 t 3
which limits the change in prices.
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Imagine the managers of land of class j follow the policy for
land of class i instead of following the policy optimal for land of class j.
Call the rent XW. The first time the land is cut, the manager earns
M(i+z)P M(i+z) while the managers of class j land earn P M(j+z) or M*(+z)
t+z t+z Mjz
as much as the j managers. Since uniform
M(i+s)
lim +1
s->co M(j+s)
M.
we know that X > XWt -i
Thus
M.
t,i ,j tj M.
The above discussion shows that:
Theorem 3.7
In the long run p is restricted to a closed interval
and its rate of change is bounded.
This theorem refers to a model in which the time horizon is
infinite. It is true because prices are bounded and it is a very weak
statement. The theorem one would like to prove is that the price path
would converge to some exponential path in the long run. With periods
separated by finite time intervals long run exponential prices won't
necessarily happen. (I have created cyclic examples for the infinite
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time case.) I conjecture that the multimarket equilibrium model will
settle to a stable equilibrium with even age distribution if it is
specified in continuous time.
A model of interest to the forestry profession is that of a
forest with an initial condition of equal amounts of land at all ages
less than a certain rotation age and no land bearing trees older than
the rotation age. This is a perfectly regulated forest. If there is
the same demand curve every period, and the rotation age is determined
from the Faustmann formula of Chapter One, X(L)/X(L) = r/(l - exp(-rL)),
then it is obvious that the policy of cutting all trees at the rotation
age and having the price be the price that clears the market will be a
steady state and a partial equilibrium. This is Theorem 3,8.
Theorem 3.8.
If 1. Demand is constant over time.
2. The rotation age L is defined by the Faustmann
formula.
3. Land is divided evenly among all classes of
age less than L.
Then, a policy of cutting trees when they reach age L
will result in a constant price for stumpage and
constant supply of stumpage. The state of the
economy is a multi-market partial equilibrium.
It is also a steady state.
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There is an easy extension of this model to a world with uncer-
tain demand. Say P = P (<M,C>)-E where E is a random variable of known
distribution F(E), the 8 's are i.i.d. For the sake of comparibility,
choose C so that e = 1; Et revealed in its own period and E> 0. Now our
problem is:
producer: max ZE(Pt (<C tM>))
s.t. X3 - BC3 = AX2
X 2 - BC 2 = AX1
XI - BC, = AX 0 , etc.
consumer Pt P(D )tmx
t t
balance Dt = <CtM>
I t =DIt Dt
"E" denotes the expected value.
Look at the last period first. Given X2 we could find (if we were lucky)
E(It ) t (s)dF = P(<Ct,M>)fEdF = P(<Ct,M>)E and e = 1. Thus, X3 (AX2 )
can be found just as before. Now consider period 2. The choice the pro-
ducer makes in period 2 is dependent on the realization of 6 in period 2.
For instance, if it is zero, the optimal policy is to cut nothing at all.
For any given E one easily finds the correct solution for all the variables
3
and finds A2(AX1 ) le Duality assures us that A2(AX 1 )/e2 AX = max E E(It)
2 t=2
subject to the constraints and given e2. We take the expected value of both
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sides of this equation to get A2 (AX2). One proceeds to solve this in the
same way for each earlier period.
One remark on comparing this to the certainty model: Imagine
that an entrepreneur made plans for the certainty case and executed them
in the uncertain demand world just described. The expected value of his
plan in the uncertain world would be equal to the value of his plan in the
world with certainty. Therefore, an optimal plan in the uncertain world
has a greater expected value than the certain plan does. The following
(by now familiar) rule should make this clear:
Xti I t mx i +t+1, t+1,i+i >
Thus X ti is bounded from below by A t+1,i+1 So EX .t exceeds both
P teM + At+1 and A t+1,i+ because P teM + At+1,0 is chosen when e is
large, and At+1 i+l is chosen when e is small.
One should notice that the introduction of c poses only a small
additional computation burden, that of solving each period's problem enough
times to estimate EXt (AXt-1
-82-
Footnote
1 This section benefitted greatly from a discussion with Hal Varian.
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Section 4
Section 4.1
Brief Description of Model:
There are two types of agents, consumers and producers. Consumers
are represented by their demand curves. Their demand in each period is
taken to be the translog factor share approximation discussed in the
succeeding section with the constraint that the log own price term be
zero. (That the long run elasticity of demand is one.) For periods
in the sample time (1950 to 1972) the demand equation is the translog
estimate with the actual values of the independent variables. For the
periods after the sample time, the independent variables are estimated
by ordinary least squares regression on a constant and the log of a
trend term. These ordinary least squares estimates are then projected
into the future. See Table 4.3. The major problems with this procedure
are two-fold. The estimate of the demand curve has a good deal more price
elasticity than seems warranted from the data, even in the long run.
This problem will be discussed again later. The demand cures are supposed
to represent the producer's (rational) expectations of demand. Can the
producers perceive shifts in the value of construction fast enough to
be able to smooth the year to year price differences? Although by using
the actual value of construction for the years of the sample period it
is assumed the producers are able to perceive the year to year changes in
demand, it is not clear that this is so. Using the trended value of
output even for the sample period would correspond to the assumption
that producers can not respond in time to smooth year to year fluctuations.
In retrospect this seems like the better assumption.
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Producers are assumed to maximize the present value of their profits
from the sale of timber, subject to biological constraints on the growing
of timber and their expectations of price. Producers expect prices to
be such that supply and demand are equated at every time t. This is
rational expectations. The most severe problem here is that there are
at least two important classes of producers -- private and public. Although
the profit maximizing assumption makes sense for the private producers, it
is not clear that it makes sinse for the Forest Service. The Forest
Service loudly announces that it makes its decisions based on noneconomic
criteria. The position taken here is that although the Forest Service
cuts less than the competitive producers in the early part of the period,
they are subject to heavy industry pressure and the effect of that
pressure has been to assure management practices (although not rhetoric)
very close to that of the prive producers in the late part of the period.
(If, indeed, the Forest Service cuts less than a competitive firm would
there are at least three justifications: 1. the Forest Service is charged
with providing recreation and range from the lands it administers, private
industry is not. 2. The Forest Service tends to own land of lower
productive capacity than the private sector. There is less incentive to cut
such land for its future growth. 3. If it is right for the private
sector to hold even one of a given age class, then, because of constant
returns to scale, it is right for the Forest Service to hold any amount
of trees in that age class.)
Producers view the world as having seven periods and the technology
for tree growing described in the sections called Linear Supply Model
(Section 3) and Supply Considerations (Section 4.3). Briefly, the supply
model says that, unless land with trees is cut, it gets one year older
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every year. Land with older trees has more lumber than land with younger
trees. Land that is cut becomes land of zero age. Given the
technology described by the linear supply model and the functional values
chosen in the section called Supply Considerations, the producers are
viewed as profit maximizing competitors. For any set of prices p and
behavioral parameter, r, each producer chooses an action (harvest) c
to maximize
7 =t1 < C(t), M > e-rt p(t) s, t. Biological Constraints
where M is a vector of the lumber contents of one acre of forest at
various ages. The interest rate parameter is the producers' rate of
nominal time discount. It includes a constant expected rate of inflation.
(Because all the pieces of the model are linear homogenous of degree zero
in prices and income, a changed unexpected rate of inflation will not
affect the policy decisions of the producers.)
It may be that many policies, C, will maximize profits for given p.
For the purpose of the next few paragraphs, assume that C is unique. The
producers' profit maximization problem is sold for C(p), the supply
function, and f(p) = <p, < C(p), M >> the profit function.
The question of what prices to use remains. Rational expectations are
posited. That is, < C(p), M > = D(p) is to be Isold for price. In fact,
this is done by the computer by maximizing t=i,7 b D iD(p ) - (p), where
b is any small number. The first order conditions for a max are
Dt < C(p), M >t, which are nothing more than the conditions for an
expected equilibrium. (The second order conditions are obviously
2
satisfied because 2 is negative definite.)
9p2
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Footnotes
1 Ernst R. Berndt and David Wood, "Technology, Prices, and the
Derived Demand for Energy," Review of Economics and
Statistics LVII, No. 3 (August 1975), p. 259.
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Section 4.2
Supply Model Details
The description above is too heuristic for those who might wish to
reproduce the results below. Following the notation of Section 3.1, define A,
B,and E as in Table 4.2.1 and Bioconstraints as in Table 4.2.2.
The producers' problem, given prices, is to choose C(t), t = 1,7 to
maximize
7r(p) = t=f,2 < C(t), M > P(t) + t= ,7 e-30rt < C(t), M > P(t)
subject to the bioconstraints.
Notice that the bioconstraints and the profit function both imply
that land gets no older between periods one and two. This is because
periods one and two are one year apart while the other periods are thirty
years apart. The reasons for this are described below.
The computer maximizes V i=f,7 b D(p) dp - 'r(p) on "p"
by the following gradient algorithm.
71. Choose P 6 R , set n = 0.
2. Find D(Pn), C at P -- call it Cn and V(Pn).
3. If C has many values, i.e., if ff takes its maximum
value on a set (Cn}, choose C E {C } to minimize
HJD(P n) - C ,MI. n n
4. Gn = D(P ) - <C , M5.
5. Find a step size, E, small enough so V(P + EG) >
V(P ) + G - Section 3 shows that this cRn be done.
6. Pn+1 Pn + EG, n = n + 1, go to 2.
The algorithm will converge to p the expected prices and C the anticipated
actions. As described below, <C, M> is the estimate of supply, given the
producers' rate of discount, r. The discount rate, r, is then chosen to
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make the harvest predicted by the model and the actual harvest as close
as possible.
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Table 4.2.1
A 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
B 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
0 -1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 -1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 -1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 -1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 -1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 -1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -1
E0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
o 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 00 0 0 0 0
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Table 4.2.2
Bioconstraints
X(0) 
= 0
X(l) = X0 + B C(l) - E C(l)
X(2) = X(l) + B C(2) + E C(l)
X(3) = X(2) + B C(3)
X(n) = X(n-1) + B C(n) n = 4,7.
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Section 4.3
Supply Considerations: Data and Growth
The data to build a supply model come from two souces. The Forest
surveys of 1970 and 1963 (called Outlook and Timber Trends, respectively) 2
provide observation of the forest inventory and removals in those years.
The Department of the Census, Current Industrial Reports series, provides
2
data on lumber and plywood production on a yearly basis. If the 1970 and
1963 data were comparable, one could construct a growth function from
this information. In fact, they are noncomparable. What I have done is use
a normal yield table for the shape of the growth function and the data in
the Forest Surveys for the scale of the function. Using the forest service
estimates of growth (5206M bd. ft. in 1970, 4582M bd. ft. in 1963) and the
census removals estimate, there is a huge discrepancy. The 1970 survey
"discovered" 17,OOOM bd. ft.
In 1930 Richard McArdle, then a Forest Service Silviculturist,
summarized forest measurements in a series of normal yield tables for
second growth Douglas Fir.3 Their tables were updated and revised by
Walter Meyer and later Donald Bruce (1949) and were revised again in 1961.
The yield tables list the following data: Average dbh, normal number of
trees per acre, volume per tree, and diameter growth by stand age and
initial diameter. "Dbh" is an abbreviation for "diameter at breast height."
Normal number of trees per acre is the number of trees per acre if there were
no natural catastrophes and if the acre were completely reseeded to begin
with. Normality is the ratio of actual trees per acre to the normal number.
In practice these conditions are rarely met.
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These tables were meant to be used to predict the growth or yield
of a homogeneous stand of trees. A forester could count the trees per
acre to estimate normality and core the trees to estimate age. Age is
important because trees grow much faster under good conditions than bad
conditions. For a given diameter at breast height, a younger tree is expected
to increase diameter faster than an older tree. The younger tree is said
to grow on higher site class land. To use the normal yield tables for an
aggregative growth function (a purpose they were not intended for), one
must know the diameter-age relationship (how good a site is) and normality.
The survey data in Outlook gives the distribution of growing stock by
diameter classes, acres occupied, and annual growth. Choice of a site
class (or age-diameter relationship) implies a yield table. Applying the
yield table and an estimate of normality to the survey data implies acreage
and growth. Thus, one can choose the site class index that most closely
matches the reported growth and acreage. After playing with many different
site class normality assumptions, I chose to assume the growth function
shown on table 4.3.1.
Using index 140 overpredicts growth, but gives a reasonable estimate
for normality. Using a higher site index would predict even more growth and
would lose normality. A lower index would raise normality (which wouldn't
be at all belieavable) but would bring growth more in line. The table
above is clearly a compromise. It is hoped that it is a reasonable
approximation for an aggregative growth function.
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Table 4.3.1
M bd. ft.
Volume
0
0
35,500
49,059
35,584
51,675
284,477
Acreage
(millions)
1.71
3.6
3.91
2.37
1.28
1.59
4.40
1 "
Bd. ft./acre int.
0
0
9,100
20,700
27,800
42,500
64,653
Site Index 2 140 Normality = .8
Age
0
30
60
90
120
150
180
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Footnotes
1 U.S. Department of Agriculture,Forest Service, Forest Resource Report 18,
Timber Trends in the U.S.; Forest Resource Report 20,
Outlook for Timber in the U.S.
2 U.S. Government, Department of the Census, Current Industrial Reports.
3 Richard McArdle, Walter Meyer and Donald Bruce, U.S. Department of
Agriculture, Technical Bulletin 201, 1949.
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Section 4.4
Demand Model:
There is considerable difficulty in estimating the demand function
for Douglas Fir stumpage. Conceptually stumpage demand is derived from
the demand for lumber and plywood, and, ultimately, the demand for construc-
tion. Seventy-two percent of all lumber and fifty percent of plywood is used
in construction.3 Douglas Fir is more likely to be used for construction
than most types of wood. The other major end use of Douglas Fir is furni-
ture, or home furnishings. My intentions were to break output down to
residential and nonresidential construction as well as furnishings and
specify stumpage demand to be the sum of the relevant Diewert factor
demands. This fails. I aggregated the value of output data of furnishings
and consumption by the share of all materials in each sector (.645 for
construction and .570 for furnishings). I denote this new number as value
and use it as my income variable. I estimated the demand equation in many
different forms; the best fit, in terms of asymptotic t statistics,
believability of estimated elasticity of demand with respect to own price,
and classification of other goods into complements and substitutes, was
a simple log linear form with the income elasticity of demand set equal to
one. This assumption corresponds to a conditional factor demand derived
from a constant returns to scale technology. (This assumption was tested:
A 99% confidence interval on the value coefficient includes 1.0). The
equation was specified with a moving average of prices other than own price,
own price, and a moving average of past own prices. Own price and the
price of other lumber were considered to be jointly determined. All other
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prices were exogenous. Two stage least squares was used throughout. The
equation was Equation 4.4.1.
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Table 4.4.1
List of Variables and Their Classifications:
PDFL en price of Douglas Fir lumber in dollars/
thousand bd. ft., mill tally
LPROD en production of Douglas Fir lumber, million
bd. ft., mill tally
VCON p value of construction put in place
MWAG p mill wages
PDFS en price of Douglas Fir stumpage, dollars/
thousand bd. ft., international 1/4" log
rule
PS p moving average of PDFS for three years,
lagged once
PDFP en price of plywood: WPI
REMO en removals of Douglas Fir in million bd. ft.,
international 1/4" log rule
QDFSP en plywood requirements of Douglas Fir, million
bd. ft., international 1/4" log rule
VFURN p value of furnishings, millions of dollars:
national product accounts
PEXA p price of autos WPI
PEXB p WPI iron and steel
PEXC p WPI nonferrous metals
PEXD p WPI nonmetalic structural minerals
PEXE p WPI rubber and plastic products
PEXF en WPI all lumber
PEXG p wages in construction
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STOCK p gross estimate of the stock of Douglas
Fir, million bd. ft., international 1/4"
log rule
PEXH p WPI board
TREN p natural log of a linear trend --
1972 = 40, 1949 = 15
p = predetermined en = endogenous
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Equation 4.4.1
REMO - VALUE = - .83( .234)
(3.5 )
3.79 PEXB
(2.47)
(1.54)
- . 101PEXG
(1.606)
( .0627)
- .283 PDFS( .129)
(2.203)
1.18 PEXC
(.844)
(1.395)
- .935 PS( .395)
(2.366)
.365 MWAG
(1.934)
( .189)
-11.11 PEXD
(6.20)
(1.80)
1.32 PEXF
(1.10)
(1.2 )
3.37 PEXA
(2.43)
(1.39)
.608 PEXE( .930)( .654)
R-squared = .9932
Durbin-Watson Statistic = 2.3488
Standard Error of the Regression = .448961 E-01
Number of Observations = 26
NOTE: MWAG, PEXA, ... PEXG are logs of three years moving averages.
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The implied own price elasticity of demand, in the long run, (that is,
through both the current price and moving average terms) is -1.2. As
expected, increases in the price of most other inputs increases the demand
for lumber. There is no good explanation for structural minerals (PEXD)
being a compliment. In regressions done by William McKillop construction
board (PEXH) shows up as a complement. Slight changes in the specification
will change those results dramatically. None of the t statistics on the
other materials reject the hypothesis that the coefficient really has the
opposite sign from what was reported. Besides materials, labor is also
used as a construction or milling input. Mill wages (MWAG) enters with
the wrong sign but it is insignificant. Construction wages (PEXG) enters
with the right sign, but it too is insignificant. McKillop thinks wage:
increases in construction should decrease lumber demand because lumber and
plywood are relatively labor intensive materials to use. Though
individually the other materials have no statistical significance, an
asymtotic F test rejects the hypothesis that they are all zero at once.
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Equations two and three are similar to equation one. Construc-
tion wages (PEXG) again show-with a negative sign, mill wages (MWAG) shows
with the proper sign and significant in equation three and wrong sign and
insignificant in equation two. The sign of the autos (PEXA) coefficient
can be ignored in both regressions because the asymptotic t value is so
small. Board (PEXH), which is included in equation two and not in equation
thre also has a small asymptotic t value. Rubber and plastic (PEXE) show
as complements to Douglas Fir in both regressions and minerals (PEXD) goes
from a substitute and significant to a complement and significant. Iron
and Steel (PEXB), nonferrous metals (PEXC), and other lumber (PEXF) are
all substitutes as expected.
I have also estimated the demand in factor share form using
the translog specification. In this specification the use of moving
averages was of no help. The equation is shown as Equation 4.4.2. The
major problem with this equation is that the estimated elasticity of
demand is near zero. The elasticity of demand for a translog form is
e = (-share + share * share + c)/share
where share is the estimated factor share and c is the coefficient
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associated with the own price term. For the translog function reported
above the elasticity is negative at two thirds of the points and positive
at one third of the points. This is not acceptable. Even though the
appropriate t statistic is seven, I have restricted the demand curve to
slope down by restricting the coefficient on own price to be zero. This
gives Equation 4.4.3.
The elasticity of demand in Equation 4.4.3 is (as in Cobb-Douglas)
-1+share, which is very close to one. This equation was used instead of
the log linear equation because it does not depend on lagged prices.
Lagged prices would complicate the rational expectations model that
follows. I regret the decision.
Equation 4.4.2
SHRS = .201E-1 + .302E-2 * PDRS - .953-3 * PEXA
( .114E-1) ( .403E-3) ( .290E-2)
(1.7 ) (7.4 ) ( .32 )
+ .265E-02 * PEXB + .907E-3 * PEXC - .120E-3 * PEXD
( .181) ( .100E-2) ( .450E-2)
(1.4 ) ( .9 ) (2.7 )
- .42E-2 * PEXE + .160E-2 * PEXF - .622E-2 * PEXG( .124E-2) ( .116E-2) ( .228E-2)
(3/4 ) (1.4 ) (2.7 )
+ .816E-3 * PEXH - .316E-2 * MWAG( .125E-2) ( .120E-2)
(.64 ) (2.6 )
N = 25
R-squared = .9681
Durbin-Watson statistic = 2.04
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Equation 4. 4. 3
SHRS = .288E-1 + 0 * PDFS + .576E-2 * PEXA( .385E-1) ( .75E-2)( .7 ) ( .76 )
+ .78E-1 * PEXG + .500E-2 * PEXC - .346E-1 * PEXD
( .714E-2) ( .214E-2) ( .103E-1)
(2.5 ) (2.33 ) (3.33 )
- .541E-2 * PEXE + .868E-2 * PEXF - .649E-2 PEXG
( .280E-2) ( .211E-2) ( .653E-2)
(1.9 ) (4.10 ) (.99 )
+ .519E-2 * MWAG( .918E-2)
(.565 )
N = 25
R-squared = .776
Durbin-Watson statistic = 1.99
Data:
Prices of other goods are the wholesale price index reported by
the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Gordon, in his thesis, points out that
these prices are not particularly good, but no better ones exist. Note:
At least part of the problem with modelling demand is the quality of the
price series for other structural products. Stumpage price is from Outlook.
Removals are calculated from data in Current Industrial Reports. Lumber
production is known in every year, as is plywood production of both
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hard and softwood plywood. Current Industrial Reports also gives the
stumpage requirements of plywood (hardwood plywood uses softwood for its
core). I have pieced this data together with an estimate of wasteage (12%)
to produce a removals series. For the years reported in Trends and Outlook,
the numbers are in agreement.
The reported stumpage prices are from sales on national forest
land. In the Douglas fir region these sales are held by open bidding.
4
Walter Mead argues that only a few bidders attend each sale and they
agree beforehand how to split the sale. His evidence is personal obser-
5
vation. This view is not generally accepted by the forest community.
I choose to believe that the sales are competitive and the prices that
result are average stumpage prices.
Average needs to be explained. The terms of each sale are
different in quantity sold, location, and species mix. Location deter-
mines logging costs and transport costs to the mill. These costs are
mainly labor and are a large portion of processing costs: processing
costs are a large portion of final price. See equation 4.4.4. Thus changes
in site location or terrain will change the bid price.
Another problem with the published stumpage price is that
the vast majority of stumpage never gets sold on the market. Internal
transfers account for much of removals and private deals on which there
6
is no data account for another section. Darius Adams chooses not to con-
sider the stumpage market for this reason. Presumably the large firms
are able to bid for Forest Service timber, so public timber can have a
price no lower than the internal transfer price of stumpage. Similarly,
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the firms can sell their stumpage to other mills, so the external price
can be no higher than the shadow price. In short, that a major amount
of the commodity is not traded is no bar to using the competitively de-
termined price.
Equation 4.4.4
PDFL = 271.4 +
(55.7)
( 4.9)
48.1 MWAG + .842 PDFS
(9.00) ( .143)
(5.3 ) (5.9 )
- 92.6 TREN
(21.9 )
( 4.24)
p = .563( .165)
(3.4 )
R2 = .9406 N = 24 d.w. = 1.8
Cochrane Orcutt Interative Technique Using Instrumental Variables
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Footnotes
1 Stanford Research Institute, America's Demand for Wood: A Report
to the Weyerhaueser Timber Company, Stanford Research
Institute, 1954.
2 William McKillop, "Supply and Demand for Forest Products,"
Hilgardia 38, No. 1, March 1967.
3 Robert J. Gordon, Problems of Measurement of Real Investment in
the U.S. Private Economy, Ph.D. Thesis, M.I.T., 1967.
4 Walter Mead, Competition and Oligopsony in the Douglas Fir Lumber
Industry, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1966.
5 Personal discussion with Henry Vaux and Dennis Teeguarden.
6 Darius M. Adams, The Impact of Changes in Federal Timber Sales
Policies on the Douglas Fir Region Forest Economy:
An Econometric Simulation, Ph.D. Thesis. Wildlife
Resource Science, University of California, Berkeley,
1972.
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Section 4.5
Empirical Results:
The multimarket equilibrium model was estimated for six years
and two interest rates. The period structure of the model is as follows:
period one is own year, period two is own year plus one, period three is
year 30 and periods four, five, six and seven are years 60, 90, 120, and
150 respectively. The point of using both the present and one year into
the future was to try to capture the producers' response to the fickle
nature of demand. As can be seen from the table below, the predicted
first period outputs and second period outputs fluctuate far more than
the actual series. This happens because the timber producers are not
able to guess demand in time to adjust to it and because the model is
numerically unstable in its first and second periods: one thirtieth the
demand of other periods is felt in these periods -- thus the gradient
associated with a mistake in these periods is small, compared to other
periods. There are at least four estimates of the first period output:
the amount demanded or the amount supplied; first period estimates or one
thirtieth third period estimates. Because of the numerical stability prob-
lem discussed above, the third period estimates divided by thirty or the
first period demand estimates would seem to be the estimates of choice.
The salient features of these estimates are that they predict
less well than the mean and that they predict large cuts at the beginning
of the sample period and smaller cuts toward the end while the actual
cutting was pretty much even over the whole period.
Actual price in dollars
per thousand bd. ft.
Calculated removals in
billion bd. ft.
PREDICTIONS WITH INTEREST RATE OF
1st period price
3rd period price, discounted
1st period supply to yr. 
1
1/30 of 3rd period supply
1st period demand
1/30 of 3rd period demand
PREDICTIONS WITH INTEREST RATE OF
1st period price
3rd period price, discounted
to yr. 1.
1st period supply
1/30 of 3rd period supply
1st period demand
1/30 of 3rd period demand
1948
14.5
10.28
1.05
5.78
6.42
21.8
23.4
13.0
1.02
10.6
15.4
21.0
12.7
13.0
1956 1960
27.6 23.4
1964
27.8
11.69 11.17 12.17
5.96
6.15
5.09
15.3
54.0
15.3
13.8
18.5
12.1
18.0
22.4
12.0
7.37
7.83
7.55
14.0
32.6
11.0
14.3
19.9
15.5
16.0
16.8
12.0
8.54
9.10
7.42
13.0
34.4
14.8
21.4
18.2
11.0
19.9
12.0
1968
44.7
1972
52.4
11.94 11.81
8.27
8.73
6.50
12.0
59.7
12.0
17.2
21.6
21.7
11.0
28.7
12.0
10.1
10.6
8.76
11.0
61.3
11.0
16.5
23.5
24.4
11.0
37.4
11.0
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This model aims at predicting the cut from behavioral consi-
derations. The mean specifies only that people did whatever they did.
Since the series has no long run trend, the model can be viewed as an
attempt to predict the mean. In this sense it is successful. From purely
behavioral considerations it was possible to predict that 11 billion board
feet of lumber would be harvested.
The problem of the time trend of the cuts is probably inherent
in the demand equation. If a near-zero demand elasticity were used, then
the predicted cuts would have no time trend. Perhaps the estimate of
demand using a moving average would give better results. It was too
expensive to find out.
The table shows, as expected, that the lower the interest rate,
the smaller the cut in the first period. Prices increase faster than the
rate of interest until the old growth is gone and then increase at a
slower rate (sometimes decreasing slightly) and tending towards a zero
rate of change by the seventh period. The rotation age in the long run
appears to be on the order of 90 years and the competitive market will
reach that point after 30 to 60 years. Below is the output for the 5 per-
cent interest rate, starting from year 1972 equilibrium.
VNEW and VOLD are the values of the objective function before
and after the current iteration. The objective function is the difference
between the integral of the demand curve and profits. In this iteration
the objective function has changed by about 7 E-9, which is a very small
number indeed. 125 iterations earlier, the objective function was changing
by about .01 each iteration. Periods one and two refer to 1972 and 1973
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respectively. Periods three through seven are 2002, 2032, 2062, 2092, and
2122. PSUPPLY is the expected price in dollars per board foot. XSUP and
XDEM are the expected quantities demanded and supplied. They must be
multiplied by ten to the twelvth (E12) to be read in board feet. X, C, LAM
are the stock and cut, each measured in acres, and the shadow price, mea-
sured in dollars per acre (multiplying by ten to the third gives the
proper scale -- E3). ALF is one half unless the age class in question
is a tie -- that is, it can either be cut or saved with no change in the
level of profits. Then ALF is adjusted to minimize the gradient squared,
or what is the same, the distance between the demand and supply points.
The seven numbers give the values for the seven age classes. Each age
class is separated from its neighbor by thirty years. Consider age class
one in period one. There are 1.53 million acres in this age class. From
the growth function displayed earlier in this section we know that there
is no timber on this land. In fact, it is bare land with tree seeds.
None of this land is cut in period one. In period two this land is still
in age class one because only one year has passed. In period three, this
land is promoted to age class two. In period four it is in age class three
and in period five it is in age class four and it is cut, along with age
class three. They reappear together as age class one land in the next
period and so on. Until the land was cut, the shadow price (LAM) column
contained the same number .875E-4. This is because the present value sha-
dow price of class two land in period three is the same as that of class
one land in period one. Class one land in period land is allowed to mature
to be class two in period three. All reported prices are discounted at the
rate of interest shown (5%).
-111-
VNEW = - .323769450E-1
VOLD =- .323769525E-1
PER D= 1
XSUP- .8756E-1
PSUPPrLY= .1081.0 y-O
XDEM = .6126E-1
9.153 E +
0. 3nE+01
0. 3 1 E + 01
0. 237E+ 01
0.128E + )1
0. 159E+01
0. 453E+'1
ER ID ( =
XSUP
C LAM ALF
0.0 ').375E-04 l.r00E+0n
0.0 0.10-03 0.50r+00 .
0.0 0.22 E-7 3 0.3 7 -+r 0
0.1 0'.301LE-fl3 0.5Th0E+00'
0.0 0.351E-03 0.500" 1
0.831'E+00 0.3 5-73 0. 4(1F+00
J.04i7E+'10 0.6005-0.f3 0.733E+-'10 0
2 PS UP(1rPL Y= 0.117'06 -1
= .6906E-1 XDEM .3087E-1
0. 1.53E+9
0. 36 0E-+P
0. 3017+0
3. 37 E+0
0. 123E+0
0. 730E+ 0
9 0 6E+0
C
i1.'
1 h
1 .
1 0.
1
3
xsUP = .3'
LAM ALF IA1
0.175F-04 09+0 1
P 1)
0 .301E-"' 0.5 0"E+"f 1
0.351E-03 700rE+00 1
0E+'00 0.3GSE-03 0.500E+00 2
7E+00 0. 0E-03 0. 2+"rE 0
ULYE 0 .310691F
455 XDEM =. 3169
x C
0.307E+1' 0.0
!.153E+01 0.9
0.350E+0 1 0.0
0.391E+01 0.'82E+01
0.237E+01 ".237E+01
0.128FE+01 0.12SE+ 01
0.310E+01 .3J10E+01
PFERID = )
XSUP .13261
LAM ALF IALF
0.335E-04 ~0.Lt 1
0.A75E-04 0.5 0'.F++00 1
).169!E-03 O.500ET+'0 1
%.22?E3Fr 0.574E+00 0
0.301E-03 0.5fl0E+00 2
f.351E-o3 0.500E+on 2
0.7)7T-"3 0.fl0E+00 2
;5t'mLY= 0.403881884_-_2
XDEM = .Il0 - _ __
0.857E-+01
0.3 07E+01
0. 153E+01
0.3 60 E+01
0.200F+01
0.0
0. 0
C r
7. 9
0.0
0.0
0.360EF+ 01
0. 200E+01
0.0
0. 0
LAM
7 t. 7 7- 0 5
0.385- 3
0. 375 E -0 
0. 1GI-03
0.92SE-03
0. 2694E-03
0. 5?2F-'
ALF IALF
0.50 17+ 1
0.5 01HE+ 1
0.500E+f0 
0.S00E+rv 2
r5007+ o 2
0. 5 n1 +0 f)
0.5r)fE+ n
r~r~ 1
--------- 
-112-
ERI0D 5 PSUPPLY= (.IG4WQ r-
LSUP - .5959E-1 _ XDEM 5 .822E-1
C M ALF
0.569E+01 0.0 0. E 0E-05 0.500+r 1
0.857E+01 0.0 0.7I47r-05 0.50+ 1
0.307E+01 0"707E+01 0.385E-04 .0+0 I
0.153F+01 0.153 +1 0.8 75E-04i 0. 5rOr+00 2
0.0 0.0 0.17E-03 0.-00q+0 2
0.0 0.0 0.1 7E-"3 0.500+0 
0.0 0.0 0.2737--n3 0.500+0Y
PF~ -- 6 PTSUPPLY= K. 2?'5024i r6 -__
XSUP- .7799E-1 XDEM - .7571E-1
0.460E+01 0.0 0.5Tr+.
1.569E+01 0.0 0.2VMT-05 0.50lE+ n 1
0.857E+01 1.8.57E+01 0. 747F-05 0.5 E-00 4-
9- 0.0 0.170E-04 0.50E+00 2
0-) 0.0 O.28E-04 0.500E+00
0.0 0.0 0.27E--T4 0.5007+-0-
0.0 ".0 0.530E-04+ 0.F00E+00 
PERiHOD) 7 r)SJPPLY= . E- 3
P- 7 XDEM - .5371E-
-C LXM ALF A
0.8757E+01 0.5;7E+01 0.0 0.500E+ 1
0.4 60rE+901 0.4 0E+1 0).1 0.5 00T-0 2
0.560E+01 0. 50+01 0.rE-05 0.500F+'0 2
0.0 0.0 0.7 I2- 0.500E+ 2
0.0 0.0 0.r705-05 0.50ME4
0.0 0.0 0.030E-og o.q00E+2
-0 .. .18 5E- 4 o. 5nn +4
-113-
Section 5
Section 5.1
Forest Service Policy:
Although the U. S. Forest Service controls 38 percent of the
land in the Douglas Fir region and 44 percent of the land bearing saw-
timber, it is not at all clear what their policy is. The intended policy
of the Forest Service is expressed in both the Multiple Use Sustained
Yield Act of 1960 and the writings of Forest Service Officials. Forest
Service policy is revealed in the cut and inventory statistics.
The best place to start is the Multiple Use Sustained Yield
Act . "National forests ... shall be administered for outdoor recreation,
range, timber watershed, and wildlife and fish purposes." Moreover this
shall be done with regard to "multiple uses" which means "the management
of the resources ... in the combination that will best meet the needs of
the American poeple" and not necessarily maximize dollar of physical
output. "Sustained yield means the achievement and maintenance in per-
petuity of a high-level annual or regular periodic output without impair-
ment of the productivity of the land." 1
Thus multiple use directs the Secretary of Agriculture to do
what he thinks best while sustained yield cautions him to produce a lot
of whatever is produced without "impairing the productivity of the land."
The act allows the National Forests to be used mostly as playgrounds or
mostly for timber production (and hopes the uses will be simultaneous and
compatible). Since the Sustained Yield Act gives so little guidance, one
must look at the statements of Forest Service policy.
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Current Forest Service policy depends upon allowable cut. Crudely,
allowable cut is determined by choosing a rotation age (90 to 120 years)
and an adjustment period (on the order of 40 years) and then finding a
policy that will produce an even aged forest (in which trees are cut at
the rotation age) at the end of the adjustment period. That is, the
Forest Service ideal is a forest containing equal numbers of acres of
every age class. Trees are cut at the rotation age. In the long run, a
constant supply of lumber results. The adjustment period is the length
of time it takes to remove the old growth and set up the even aged forest.
During the adjustment period there may be much larger harvests than will
obtain during the even rotation regime.2 The justification for all the
even flow or sustained yield statements, at the Forest Service level,
seems to be short term economic stability. 3
Two recent Forest Service studies deserve attention in this
respect. The Douglas Fir Supply Study of 1969 calculates increment to
present discounted value of a number of management alternatives. The
basic finding is tat using a 5% rate of discount anything that hurries up
the cut will increase net worth. The management alternatives considered
in that report are not even flow alternatives. That is, the increase in
output cannot be sustained, it is a once and for all increase. A prelimi-
nary draft of the Forest Regulation Study done in 1973, but not officially re-
leased, is critical of the Douglas Fir Supply Study. The regulation
study points to the Multiple Use Sustained Yield Act and says that the
management alternatives in the Supply Study do not meet the sustained yield
requirements of the act. The point is that maximization of present net
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worth is not consistent with an even flow constraint; this inconsistency
is recognized within the Forest Service and the desirability of the
various aims is debated.
(The Douglas Fir Supply Study proceeds on the assumption that
the price of stumpage (properly defined) will be at 140% of the 1970 level
thirty years hence. Calculations are made in real terms with an interest
rate of 5 percent. My prediction uses a 5 percent nominal interest rate
and yields a 400% increase in price over the same time interval. Taking
account of the difference between nominal and real prices, my estimate
and the study's estimate are grossly compatible. The study recommends
more intensive management to produce more lumber sooner and increase
present value.)
Finally the writings of the Chief Foresters McCardle (1956)
Cliff (1968), and McGuire (1974) point to the Forest Service walking a
political tightrope between the conservationists and industrial forces.
McGuire seems particularly concerned with the conflict between the re-
creation and timber industry groups: He claims to chart a course
"somewhere in between".
A cynical (and essentially correct) summary of the preceeding
discussion is: The Forest Service sets its harvest policy according to
political pressure and its own sense of what is good for America. The
decision gives weight to quantity stabilization, recreational needs, and
forestry industry needs.
Objective functions for forest management differ in their use
of interest rate, value to standing stock for noncommercial use, even flow
considerations, and expected prices. The hard line Sustained Yield School
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can be characterized as maximizing physical output (price expected constant,
zero interest rate, even flow constraint, no explicit stock value) with the
constraint that the flow of timber be the same in every period. A soft
line Sustained Yield School forester would lessen the even flow constraint.
(Perhaps, like Carl Jugenfeld he would attach a penalty for rapid changes
in the rate of harvest.)4 My proposal is to use a positive (in fact, market)
discount rate and value the standing stock explicitly. Moreover I would
use expected prices and place no inherent even flow constraints on the
model. Something approaching the Soft Line Sustained Yield School notion
of even flow will result. The demand curves working through expected prices
will assure that the period to period change in stumpage sales is not very
great. The net result of changing from the amorphous arithmetic of sus-
tained yield to the calculus of present value maximization with rational
expectations may well be just a little more than a change in rationaliza-
tion.
The next section will contend that a moderate valuation of the
stock of timber for noncommercial uses is sufficient to produce a policy
very much like the Forest Service's current policy. It remains to enumer-
ate the fine details that will differ. The present value model allows
correct assessment of management practices. Proposals (of which there are
many) for intensified management should be accepted if they increase the
present value of the forest with stock valued. Thus this model will dif-
fer from sustained yield in which projects it accepts. Sustained yield
may require the benefits of a project to be spread over many years, or,
in what's called the allowable cut effect, sustained yield may make it
possible to harvest more timber in the very first year and that may domi-
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nate the objective function.5 The allowable cut effect needs some explana-
tion. Because of even flow constraints too little timber is cut at the
beginning of the planning period. With even moderate interest rates (5%
real) what happens in thirty years matters only one quarter as much as what
happens today. But if even flow constraints are in effect, then an invest-
ment today that will result in say 30,000 extra board feet in thirty
years will resutl in an extra cut today of 1,000 board feet. Because of
the even flow constraint, management practices that would not be profitable
for a profit maximizing firm appear desirable to a maximum sustained
yielder.
Another major difference between sustained yield and profit
maximization with stock valued is that the sustained yield school does
not try to adjust its sales to current market conditions. The Forest Ser-
vice should calculate its reservation price for timber sales based on
what it thinks it can get for the timber in a year with large construction
demand, not on some notion of "fair profit" for the mills. If selling
no timber when there is no demand is too unpalatable, the Forest Service
could at least extend the period a logger has in which to cut contracted
timber and let the logger reap the speculative profits. (Since loggers
bid against each other, the expected value of these profits is the logger's
payment for accepting the risk involved.)
The last advantage to the profit-maximizing stock valued approach
is clarity of thought. The Multiple Use Sustained Yield Act directs the
Secretary of Agriculture to manage the forests for both commercial and
noncommercial purposes. Choosing a stock value (one would hope by careful
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research on what people would pay for recreation, and what the nation as
a whole should pay for wildlife) and choosing timber value as the dis-
counted market price makes it very clear what products are produced by
our forests and how much our public servants value these products. If
the logging industry or the conservationists don't like the decision,
let them go to Congress; there the discussion can be dominated properly:
in the public's money.
Section 5.2
Imputed Value:
Although the writings of the Forest Service shed very little
light on the actual tradeoffs the Service makes between recreational and
commercial use of the forests, actual Forest Service decisions can be used
to impute a value per acre to the Forest Service holdings. At
both the Forest Service and the competitive sector hold virgin timber.
The multi-market partial equilibrium model (model) implies that the price
of stumpage must be rising fast enough to make the holding decision rational
for the private sector. A result is that it must also maximize Forest
Service revenues. So long as the private sector continues to hold mature
timber, there is no implications about Forest Service policy. However,
in twenty or thirty years, private sector holdings of old stock will be
negligible compared to the public holdings. It is at that time that the
Forest Service valuation of its standing stock will be revealed. Using
the model with an interest rate of 5%, it is possible to impute a value
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per acre to Forest Service land held past the time a private operator
would cut it. That is, the value per acre is the sum of the acres value
for timber plus the acres value for recreation, wildlife, etc. which we
shall call noncommercial use. Consider old growth timber in 2002. An
acre of land bearing old growth would sell for about $690. A profit
maximizing manager would cut the timber. Instead, suppose the Forest
Service owned the land and decided to save the trees for one more period
(30 years). The policy of holding the trees thirty years longer would
give the land an imputed value of 522 dollars. Thus the noncommercial
value of old growth must exceed $5.50 per year for it to be worthwhile
to the Forest Service to hold the timber. Similarly, in the year 2032,
an additional valuation of sixty cents per acre would make the differ-
ence between keeping and cutting ninety year old trees for thirty more
years.
At first glance these values seem small. Yet one must remem-
ber that something on the order of six million acres are involved. Thus
a complete no rent policy would cost thirty million dollars per year at
the computed expected prices. If the Forest Service were to cut none
of its holdings, prices would undoubtably be a good deal higher, so it
is erroneous to carry the analysis too far. Similarly, a first guess
at what it would cost the Forest Service to use a rotation age longer
by thirty years than the one employed in the private sector is three
and a half million dollars per year. All of these figures are not cash
payout, but own year foregone value of income, or shadow cost.
The previous exercise is meant mostly to be illustrative. The
model I have used predicts the gross shape of the forest economy. It
cannot distinguish between rotation ages of 80 and 110 years, nor can it
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say that an allowable cut that liquidates inventories in forty years
instead of twenty-five years is off base. What the previous exercise
shows is that a relatively modest value for noncommercial use per acre
will be enough to justify the broad outline of the Forest Service
management policy. By simply choosing a relatively small dollar value
per acre per year for noncommercial uses, the Forest Service could easily
justify their present policy (or virtually any other policy).
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